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PREFACE
In recent years the sociology of deviance has unde rgone a majo r shift in
emphasis. Early investigations into the re la tion of sociai processes to the phenome na of deviance were couched in a perspective focusing on the individuai qualities
of the deviant actor.

A relatively new orientation has emerged, however, which con-

c e ntra tes the analysis of deviance in processes of reality construction as they relate

to political authority. Socio-politlca l defin itions of deviance do not reflect deviants'
relationships to political authority based upon the ir acceptance of a generalized consensus.

Rather, socia l deviance has acquire d the status of a phenome na within that

sphere of social discourse through which va rying fonns of c ons cirusness are granted
legitimation.

The em e rgence of deviance as a quas i- legitimate fann of social exis-

tence herein is held to underly the socio-political trans formation of stigma and the
reconstitution of commitment to a re s ultant mediational identity.

Thi s thesis proffe r S'

D

'unique theoretical app roac h to t he s tudy of deviance .

It is one in which phenomenologica l commitment a nd social action a re he ld to result

from a form of collective legitimation through ide ntity transformation.

The process

of identity transformation su bsequently leads to a positive, essentia l s tatus for a
form of colle ctive -identity.

Drawing heavily upon the work of Alfre d Schutz, struc-

tures of relevance are specified for collective-identities in the publications of voluntary
associations of homose xua ls. These publications function as a referent for hegemonic

meanings which reflect the collective - self of these associations of deviants .
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These collective-selves represent symbollc communities which may be struc turally analyzed through a specification of phenomenological commitment and Its
accompanying relevance structures. To accompllsh this theoretical endeavor, this
thesis employs a Marxian sociology of knowledge.

The appropriate methodological

apparatus relies on phenomenological commitment for the specification of communltyconsciousness as it relates to fanns of "phantasied" social praxis.

This work also provides a critique of detenninlstic Marxism as well as an
Investigation of social knowledge from the perspective of Karl Mannheim.

It is

shown that these orientations both represent modes of thought which cannot approach
the phenomena of ideology in a reflexive manner.

This critique is based on an

interpretation of the theoretical orientation of Antonio Gramsci as presented in his

Selections From the Prison Notebooks (1972). Subsequently, ideological modalities
are specified through an interpretation of the Marxian nature of the individua l's relation to the community of deviants. Emphasis Is placed upon the intersubjective
• JlI'e of association and the Ideological modalities which may be identified within
categor ies of reifled or processural legitimation.
Following its development, this theoretical orientation is used as an approach
to a specific identiflcational structure of devlance--homosexuality. TIle homosexual
community is shown to retain certaIn structural

fe.li.~l1res

which function to dereify

identity while maintaining an Internal hegemonic structure . Thus, deviance may

occur among homosexuals as well as between the homosexual and heterosexual
symbolic orders . The differences among the various s trata of the homosexual community are specified through an examination of phenomenological relevance structures

-iv-

of the associational collective-self.

This approach Involves an Intuitive analysis of

various themes of relevancy within the publications of voluntary associations representing the symbolic order of homosexuality.
Literature obtained from 21 voluntary associations is examined as th e "data"
of this inquiry.

The methodological apparatus for the analysis of this literature is

based on two components of each respective substructure of legitimation--its

Marxian nature and its phenomenological commitment to social change. The Marxian
nature of each association is identified through the projected relationship of the
individual de viant to the legitimizing community.

Reified and processural types of

relations between the individual and the community are specified through analysis
of statements in the literatu re of these volunta ry associations.

The phenomenological

commitment to social change is identified through various ideological modalities which
reflect identifiable commitments to social change. A referent typology Is constructed
from these two theoretical components (Marxian nature and phenomenological commitment) which se rves as an ideological map of the stnlcture of legitimation within
the homosexual community.

In order to extend the analysis herein developed, ethno-

methodological research is conSidered desirable since the emergent base of these
communities cannot be adequately scrutinized from the thematic data examined in
this thesis.

The ideological chardcter of homosexual communities must be placed

in a contextual nexus

50

that th.:: activity of intersubjectlve negotiation within phe-

nomenological commitment is made central to further analysis.
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This thesis examines the hegemonic function of symbolic structures of
relevance as they are related to phenomenological commitments to social cha nge

he ld by voluntary associations of homosexuals.

The data base of this investigation

consists of the literature of 21 homophile organizations.
Organizational literature is used to facilitate a theoretical adaptation of

Alfred Schutz' discussion of relevance structures which addresses the hegemonic
organization of voluntary associations.

The concept of relevance structure was

implemented to relate predominant orientations within the sociology of deviance to
a phenomenological interpretatIon of group commitment to social Change.

The

specificatjon of various Levels of phenomenological commitment serves as a heuristic
device for scrutinizlng the instrumental as well as expressive functions fulfilled by
relevance structures. These hegemonic components sustain a "phantasied praxis"
within a particularistic world-view.

This conception of socia l praxis was drawn

from Antonio Gramsci's interpretation of a Marxian sociology o f knowledge.
Subsequently, the relevance structures of each association are juxtaposed to its
level of phenomenological commitment as well as its Marxian nature.

This opera -

tion culminated in the construction of a referent typology which outlines "familles"
of relevance structure in relation to orientations to phantasied praxis.

CHAPTER 1
QUAL ITA TIVE SOClAL PRAXIS:
THE DEREIFICATION OF STIGMA

Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the delineation of selected portions of a
body of knowiedge co nventionally identified as the study of social deviance with
specific emphasis upon the various theoretical assumptions e mbodied in the
" societal reaction" perspective. An explanation for the social-psychological
change or transformation of "Identity" which stigmatized individuals may undergo
Is examined theoretically. TItis transformation is shown to be most adequately
explained through an investigation of the complementarity of the assumptions
embodied in the labeling and phenomenological orientations to the study of social
deviance.
The labeling orie ll ~il tioB gives an adequate emphasis to deviance amplifying
processes as institutionally Uerived through the imputation of "alienated power"
which is realized within stigmatizing definitions.

The phenomenological per-

spective lends theoretical explanations for the existence of "secret deviance" and
also adds c redibility to th., concept of secondary deviation perceived as th~
"consciousness" of and belief in a "we-union." The penumbral area of belief
links the two orientations to subuniverses of meaning at the theoretical level.

- 1-
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Deviance and Labeling
Attempts to explain social behavior through the formulation of sociological
theory may be grouped around two conceprually polar points of view. On one hand
society is viewed "as a network of human activity" (Berger and Pullberg, i965: 196),
while on the other extreme it "presents us with society conceived as a thing-like
facticity, standing over and against its individual members with coercive controls
and molding them in the socializing processes" (Berger and Pullberg, 1965: 196).
These seeming ly contradictory views are inadequate to explain behavioral relationships when each is considered independently.

However, if viewed as

complementary opposites embodying the producer (man) and the product (society)
in an ever-moving dialectic, a comprehensive understanding of social life is
practicable. indeed, Berger and Pullberg state:
If we understand this process as involving both subjective productivity
and objective product, men producing society and in rum being
produced by it, then our theorizing will be propelled towards formulations of this dialectic in its totality. Indeed it will become necessary
to understan ~ ociety as a dialectical process (1965: 197).

The sociology of deviance has undergone major changes in Its assumptions
concerning the narure of deviant behavior in recent years.

These new conceptions

have been incorporated into a perspective which emphasized the relationship
between deviance and the resulting stigma as products of dynamic Interactional
siruations and not pre - ordained characteristics of the individual. A major premise
of this orientation holds that deviance is the result of a definitional statement of
" undeslrability" facilitated by an imputational relation with a significant other
embodying some form of coercive power in relationship to the individual.

That

-3is , deviance represents a product of "alienated power. " 111is orientation has
become popularly known as labeling theory.
Those theoretical orientations previously posited within the s tudy of
deviance have tended to concentrate on the "pathological" qualities of the individual or on those of his environment.

These pathologies were considered to be

the etiological source of deviant behavior patterns .

The concept of environmental

pathology inferred the status of an organic totality to society that was couched in
terms of health (functional) or illnes s (dysfunctional).

To view society as a con-

sensual totality enabled the concept of pathology to survive existentialist doubts
regarding biologica l determinism and aliowed pathology to be couched in terms of
personal states-of-being as "hea lthy" or "ill" (Matza, 1969: 41-43). I C. Wright
Mills in his now classic work, " The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists "
(1943), demonstrates that the sociological concept of social pathology reflects a
belief in the homogenous character of social norms a nd fails to explain " deviations
from norms in terms of the nonns themselves." Mills states that " If the 'norms'
were examined, the in .

l iga tor would perhaps be carried to see total structures

of norms and to relate the se to distributions of power" (Mills, 1963: 534) .
Labeling theorists generally accepted Mills' conceptualization and attempted
to demonstrate that deviance is not a characteristic of acts which infringe upon
consensual norm s , but instead it is a product of human deflnltions based vn varying pOSitions of power in impositlona l situations of interaction .

Those scholars

subscribing to the labeling perspective, however, contend that deviance does not
exist until an individua l is formally Identified.

They a rgue the act of labeling by

moral entrepreneurs represents the cause of deviant phenomena (Becker, 1974: 42).
While the misery and social difficulties associated with the designation of the
Individual as a deviant cannot be denied, the public designation of an Individual as
deviant Is not a necessary condition for the existence of a perceived state of deviation by the Indlvidual. 2 This Is an inherent characteristic of Becker's original
definition of deviance which was couched In what has become known as the
Inte ractlonlst pe rspecti ve.
Becker (1963) argues that deviance is not a quality of an act, but Is a
result of the applicatlon of rules which sanction behavior.

Within the context of

this notion is the implicit assumption that a deviant act can be detected by the
investigator without the aid of the perception and subsequent labeling of the act as
deviant by members of the community (Katz, 1972: 189). Becker develops a typology of deviant behavior in which the parameters establish "obedient behavior as
opposed to rule-breaking behavior" and present the possibilities of an individual
who is either (I)

false l ~

deviant (1963: 20).

3ccused; (2) a pure deviant; (3) confonning; or (4) a secret

TIlis typology implies that the categories of "secret deviance"

and the '1iIIsely accused" are detectable apart from the labeling since classificatory
rules exist independent of the labeling process (Katz, 1972: 189). Such a typology,
then, posits the existence of two categories of Individuals. The first includes
those Individuals who have engaged in acts which may be designated as deviant,
but who for some reason escaped labeling.

The second category invol yeS those

individuals who have been "officially" labe led and also Includes persons, who,
while treated as a deviant, never committed the deviant act (see Becker, 1974;

-5-

Kitsuse and Cicourel. 1963; and Sudnow. 1967). Secret deviance Is an Inherent
characteristic of the flrst category. whe r eas the falsely accused Individual and
the pure or secondary deviant arr iocated in the second category.
Apart from a concern for the source of stigma in behavioral definitions
of deviance. the interactionist perspective has emphasized the process of deviant
identification. l111s process proceeds from a state of being in which deviant acts
are considered a part of the individual's identity (primary de viation) to a state of
being which confers a status of " secondary deviation" in which the deviant identity
is the centralizing fact in the individual'S life. guiding and conforming his
behavior to the expectations attendent to that identity (Lemert. 1951; 1967: 63).
Of central importance to the facilitation of this proce ss is the existence of
denunciation ceremonies which are products of categorical definitions positing
the statuS of deviance to a particular act (see Lofland. 1969. and Garfinkel. 1956).
The se ceremonies present a unified moral conception of the actor as a deviant
(Lofland. 1969: 156) and symbolize "the public affirmation of social ideals and
[iorms" (Gusfield. 1967: 176) which "impose a structure of meaning upon the sociai
world by creating one of the most significant and coherent identities that men
ca n impute to the ir fellows" (Carson. 1974: 79).

This "absolute" moral statement

represents a symbolic instanCe of "fetichized morality" through which humaniy
created rules may be construed as ontoiogical entities.

The internalization of

this impositional statement. however. is a result of intersubjective identification.
The centrailty of the denunciation ceremony to the self_identification as
deviant. then. does not account for instances of self-labeling which as Katz

-6(1972 : 187-188) has Indicated, may reflect an actual breach of rules or may be a
self-imposed label produced by intuitive mechanisms. Becker (1974 : 47-48)
attempts to clarify the problem posed by this category of deviance by suggesting
that it objectifies a state-of-being In which the actor perceives himself to be
vulnerable to the imputation of a deviant Identification by Others.

HaWkins and

Tledemam(1975) have identified two POSsible effects of deviant self-Identlflcatlon __
objective and subjective effects. Objective effects exist as a result of instltutional actions which serve to stigmatize the accused individual on the level of
existence. Subjective effects are referred to by HaWkins and Tiedemannas " the
way in which deViant thinks about himself and his situation," and "the way he now
interprets the SOCial world around him from the vantage point of his new status"
(1975: 242). Objective effects and subjective effects as utilized in the labeling

orientation are conSidered necessary components of "secondary deviation." but
If viewed as independent motivations for perceptions of deviance by Individuals,
several possibilities exist.

These "POSsibilities" are well represented in the

follow n diagram taken from Hawkins and Tiedemann (I 975: 242):
Rule Violation Occurs and Is Known
Objectl ve Effects
Present
Subje ctive
Effects

~,,!s~n!. complete labeling

Absent

naive optimism

Absent
imagine labeling

neutralized deviance

The designated procedures for discovering deviance, then, are not
contlogent upon the SOcial identification of the individual as a deviant.

For

instance, observers may determine whether an act of theft has OCcurred and may
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impute the responsibility for this act to an Individual; but. as Katz (1972: 191)
suggests. the charge of "being a thief" associated with the charge of theft cannot
be scientificaliy verified without the imputation of a negative ontological status
(essence).

Thi s necessarily Implies that the designation of deviance constitutes

a moral judgme nt which exists as an "essentializlng" element. 'This judgment
employs the postulated notion of the Individual' s "substantial self" (Douglas.
1970: 388). Thus. deviance is construed as being the result of symbolic interaction allowing fo r the possibility of a negative state-of-being rather than a
designation of the inherent characteristic of an act.

Moral judgments, then, are

inherent in the formulation of that law which circumscribes "public morality"

(Quinney. 1975: 254).
The labeling perspective as it has developed within the sociology of deviance
has called attention to the subjective nature of definitional statements of categorical
deviance.

This recognition has led to a subsequent emphasis on the impact of

labeling on t

"felf- - a n impact which is a result of the ontological imputation of a

negative essence .

The internalization of this negative esse nce

~ be

imposed

on the self but must result from a belief in its relevance to the individual.

Phenomenology and Deviance
A recent shift in orientation within the sociology of df"v1.ance has involved
attempts to conjoin the interactionist perspective with a phenomenological

approach. This merger has emphasized the Intersubjective qualities of perceived
deviant phenomena.

incorporating Schutzlan social psychology. this orientation

focuses upon the everyday world of the individual as the typifying structure through

-8which deviant phenomenon (in the Ourkheimian tradition) play a major role in
order maintenance (Douglas. 1970; Erickson. 1966; and Shoham . 1975).
The approach taken by phenomenological sociologists of deviance is based

upon a view of social s tructure as an aspect of everyday life.

Following from the

observation of W. I. Thomas that " If men define situations as real. they are real
In their consequences. " a concentration on the morality and respectability of

mundane social existence has become a central focal concern for these theorists
(Rock. 1972: 20-27).
Rock (1972) suggests that to allow perceptions of mundane social structure
into a genuinely phenomenological analysis is contrary to the necessity of abstraction for sociological explanation. An epistemological synthesis of phenomenalism
with Verstehen Is not possible when the deviance and immorality of a specific
phenomena are emphasized. 3 These taken-for-granted categorical meanings.
instead. must yield a basis for an examination of subjective characteristics and
effects of devi

: he nomenon upon these categories of social relations which

yield objective circumstances (Rock, 1972: 24-25).

To accept the existence of

core values in a society is to reify an order as sui generis a nd Is not representative of a phenomenological approach to the social construction of reality or the
subjective pe rception of that reality in the fonn of Individual consciousness.
Berger and Luckmann hold that. by definition. the relfied world Is a dehumanized
world "In which man loses (or is denied) the cognizance of his authorship of the
world and the sense of the dialectical interplay between man the producer and
SOCiety the product" (1967: 89). It is not sufficient. however. for deviance to be

- 9viewed as categorical imputations of a negative status.

Instead, emphasis also

must be placed upon the perception of this imputation on the subjective level and
the possibility of the negotiation of the meanings appUed to the imputational action.
Thus, if sociologists of deviance are to adequately describe the phenomena,
a theoretical framework must be delineated which accounts for the human construction of moral meanings embodied in social reality.

It is not sufficient to imply

that since a certain form of behavior is viewed by its participants as embodying
a negative and/or different state-of-being, that it necessarily represents a
transgression of existing "core values." Instead, an explanation for deviance
must be advanced which clarifies the origins of meaning attached to a deviant act
embodied In the imputation of an ontological status reflecting those values which
are perceived to exist.

This involves an examination of the process of deviance

creation which has been the central concern of the labellng perspective (Schur,
1975: 288- 290).

Such a process may exist on the public level, as in situations

where alienated power is based on authority relations, or it may exist on the level
of inte rsubjective, everyday existence.

These two levels of rule creation and

hence deviance creation serve to accentuate the dialectical relation between the
official reality embodied in formal political rules to a "deviant" reality which may
be a product of an imputed identity resulting from the Internalization of typified
behavioral expectations.
Rotenberg has attempted to spell out a basic orientation toward the
phenomena of self labellng which, in his estimation, serves as a "missing link"
in the societal reaction theory of deviance.

in outlining instances of seli-Iabeling

from which "deviant" identities arise, Rotenberg states that
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moral entrepreneurs represents th<: cause of deviant phenomena (Becker, 1974: 42).
While the misery and social difficulties associated with the designation of the
individual as a deviant cannot be denied, the public designation of an individual as
de viant is not a necessary condition for the existence of a perceived state of deviation by the individual.

2

This is an inherent characteristic of Becker's original

definition of deviance which was couched in what has become known as the
interactionist perspective .

Becker (1963) argues that deviance is not a quality of an act, but is a
result of the application of rules which sanction behavior.

Within the context of

this notion is the implicit assumption that a deviant act can be detected by the
investigator without the aid of the perception and subsequent labeling of the act as
deviant by members of the community (Katz, 1972: 189).

Becker develops a typo-

logy of deviant behavior in which the parameters establish "obedient behavior as
opposed to rule-breaking behavior" and present the possibilities of an individual
,.ho is either (1) falsely accused; (2) a pure deviant; (3) conforming; or (4) a secret
dev';ant (1963: 20).

This typology implies that the categories of "secret deviance"

and the "falsely accused" are detectabie apart from the iabeling since classificatory
rules exist independent of the labeling process (Katz, 1972: 189). Such a typology,
then, posits the e xistence of two categories of individuals. The first includes
those individuals who have engaged in acts which may be designated as deviant,
but who for some reason escaped labeling. The second category involves those
individuals who have been "officially" labe led and also includes persons, who,
while treated as a deviant, never committed the deviant act (see Becker, 1974;

-5Kltsuse and Cicourel, 1963; and Sudnow, 1967). Secret deviance is an Inherent
characteristic of the first category, whereas the falsel y accused individual and
the pure or secondary deviant are located in the second category.
Apart from a concern for the source of stigma in behavioral definitions
of deviance, the interactionist perspective has emphasized the process of deviant
identification.

This process proceeds from a state of being in which deviant acts

are considered a part of the individual's identity (primary deviation) to a state of
being which confers a starus of "secondary deviation" in which the deviant Identity
is the centralizing fact in the individual's life, guiding and conforming his
behavior to the expectations attendent to that identity (Lemert, 1951; 1967: 63).
Of central importance to the facilitation of this process is the existence of
denunciation ceremonies which are products of categorical definitions positing
the starus of deviance to a particular act (see Lofland, 1969, and Garfinkel, 1956).
These ceremonies present a Wluied moral conception of the actor as a deviant
(Lofland.

' 9: 156) and symbolize "the public affirmation of social ideals and

norms" (Gusfle ld, 1967: 176) which " impose a strucrure of meaning upon the social
world by creating one of the most Significant and coherent identities that men
can impute to their fellows" (Carson, 1974: 79).

This "absolute" moral statement

represents a symbolic instance of "fetichized morality" through which humanly
created rules may be construed as ontological entities.

The internalization of

this impositional statement, however, is a result of intersubjective identification.
The centrality of the denunciation ceremony to the self-identification as
deviant, then, does not account for instances of self-labeling which as Katz

-6(1972: 187-188) has indicated, may reflect an actual breach of rules or may be a
self-imposed label produced by intuitive mechanisms. Becker (1974: 47-48)
attempts to clarify the problem posed by this category of deviance by SUggesting
that it objectifies a state-of-being in which the actor perceives himself to be
vulnerabie to the imputation of a deviant identification by Others.

Hawkins and

Tiedemam(1975) have identified two possible effects of deviant self-identification __
objective and subjective effects. Objective effects exist as a result of institutiona I actions which serve to stigmatize the accused individual on the level of
existence. Subjective effects are referred to by Hawkins and Tiedemannas " the
way in which deviant thinks about himself and his situation, " and "the way he now
interprets the Social world around him from the vantage pOint of his new status"
(1975: 242). Objective effects and subjective effects as utilized in the labeling
orientation are considered necessary components of "secondary deviation," but
if viewed as independent motivations for perceptions of deviance by individuals,

several possibilities exist.

These "posSibilities" are well represented in the

tU t/owing diagram taken from HawkiM and Tiedemann(1975: 242):
Rule Vioiation Occurs and Is Known
Objective Effects
Present
Subjective
Effects

Absent
imagine iabe ling
neutralized deviance

The designated procedures for discovering deviance, then, are not
contingent upon the social identification of the individual as a deviant.

For

instance, observers may determine whether an act of theft has occurred and may

impute the responsibility for this act to an individual; but. as Katz (1972: 191)
suggests. the charge of "being a thief" associated with the charge of theft cannot
be scientifically verified without the imputation of a negative ontological status
(essence).

nus necessarily implies that the designation of deviance constitutes

a moral judgment which exists as an "e ssentializing" element. nus judgment
employs the postulated notion of the individual's " substantial self" (Douglas.
1970: 388 ). Thus. deviance is construed as being the result of symbolic interaction allowing for the possibility of a negative state-of-being rather than a
designation of the inherent characteristic of an act. Moral judgments. then. are
inherent in the fomlulation of that law which circumscribes "public morality"
(QUinney. 1975: 254).
The labeling perspective as it has developed within the sociology of deviance
has called attention to the subjective nature of definitional statements of categorical
deviance.

Th 'Il recognition l1as led to a subsequent emphasis on the impact of

labeling on the self--an impact which is a result of the ontological imputation of a
negative essence.

The internalization of this negative essence cannot be imposed

on the self but must result from a belief in its relevance to the individual.

Phe nomenology and Deviance
A recent shift in orientation within the sociology of deviance has involved
attempts to conjoin the interactionist perspective with a phenomenological
approach.

This merger has emphasized the intersubjective qualities of perceived

deviant phenomena.

Incorporating Schutzian social psychology. this orientation

focuses upon the everyday world of the individual as the typifying structure through

-8which deviant phenomenon (in the Durkheimian tradition) playa major role in
order maintenance (Douglas, 1970; Erickson, 1966; and Shoham, 1975).
The approach taken by phenomenological sociologists of deviance is based
upon a view of social structure as an aspect of everyday life.

Following from the

observation of W. I. Thomas that "if men define situations as real, they are real
in their consequences, " a concentration on the morality and respectability of
mundane social existence has become a central focal concern for these theorists
(Rock, 1972: 20-27).
Rock (1972) suggests that to allow perceptions of mundane social structure
into a genuinely phenomenological analysis is contrary to the necessity of abstr'dction for sociological explanation. An epistemological synthesis of phenomenalism
with Verstehen is not possible when the deviance and immorality of a specific
phenomena are emphasized. 3 These taken-for-granted categorical meanings,
instead, must yield a basis for an examination of subjective characteristics and
effects of deviant phenomenon upon these categories of social relations which
yield objective circumstance s (Rock, 1972: 24-25). To accept the existence of
core values in a society is to reify an order as sui generis and is not representative of a phenomenological approach to the social construction of reality or the
subjective perception of that reality in the form of individual consciousness.
Berger and Luckmann hold that, by definition, the reified world is a dehumanized
world "in which man loses (or is denied) the cognizance of his authorship of the
world and the sense of the dialectical interplay between man the producer and
society the product" (1967: 89). It is not sufficient, however, for deviance to be
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viewed as categorical imputations of a negative starus.

Instead, emphasis also

must be placed upon the perception of this imputation on the subjective level and
the possibility of the negotiation of the meanings applied to the imputational action.
Thus, if sociologists of deviance are to adequately describe the phenomena,
a theoretical framework must be delineated which accounts for the human construction of moral meanings embodied in social reality.

It is not sufficient to Imply

that since a certain form of behavior is viewed by its participants as embodying
a negative and/or different state-of-being, that it necessarily represents a
transgression of existing "core values." Instead, an explanation for deviance
must be advanced which clarifies the origins of meaning attached to a deviant act
embodied in the imputation of an ontological status reflecting those values which
are perceived to exist. This involves an examination of the process of deviance
creation which has been the central concern of the labeling perspective (Schur,
1975: 288- 290).
where alienated

Such a process may exist on the public level, as in siruations
POWle L

's based on authority relations, or it may exist on the level

of intersubjective, everyday existence. These two levels of rule creation and
hence deviance creation serve to accenruate the dialectical relation between the
official reality embodied in formal political rules to a "deviant" reality which may
be a product of an imputed identity resulting from the internalization of typified
behavioral expectations.
Rotenberg has attempted to spell out a basic orientation toward the
phenomena of self labeling which, in his estimation, serves as a "missing link"
in the societal reaction theory of deviance.

In outlining instances of self-labeling

from which "deviant" identities arise, Rotenberg states that

- 10there is a difference between labeling certain behaviors "melancholic"
or "schizophrenic" and reversing the dialectic by saying you behave in
that manner because "you are schizophrenic." That is. the dependent
variable (schizophrenia) is fallaciously taken as the independent
variable (1974: 337).
This categoric label which is perceived as the primary origin of deviance
within the individual refers "to one's basic social and self-identity and is related
to one's position. rank. sex. class. etc. It categorically classifies one. in one's
own eyes and in the eyes of others. as a 'success' or failure.' as 'in' or 'out.'
'good' or 'bad'" (Rotenberg. 1974: 340), This representation of the constitution
of a deviant identity is similar to Berger and Luckmann's concept of a reified
identity or total self in which there is a "total identification of the individual with
his socially assigned typifications. He is apprehended as nothing but that type"
(1967: 91) which results in the conferring of a "master status" (Rock. 1974: 169).4
Secondary role performance. as viewed by Berger and Luckmann. exists in
anonymity where it may be detached from the actors involved. This anonymity and
detachment of

0' ~ 's

self from roles when incorporated in active perceptions of

reality enables the individual to bracket or suspend "objective" belief in his
secondary role relations. Thus. realizing the subjective nature of secondary
roles enables the individual to "detach a part of the self and its concomitant reality
as relevant only to the role-specific situation in question" (1967: 143). This ability
eXists. Berger and Luckmann argue. so long as the individual does not incorporate
a reified identity (1967: 143). A reified identity fails to recognize the symbolic
distinction between the public and private dimensions of social life. Authorship
of one's destiny is perceived to eXist outside the intentional acts of men engaging in
Intersubjective eXistence. and is located in higher moral sources construed as
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"objective." Thus, an imposition of negative essence which is internalized by an
individual will possibly result in the production of a deviant identity since the individual's behavior is perceived and internalized as a mOld I transgression of a
unified and consensual totality.
This implication that deviance is an instance of an a priori ontological
categorization of an individual's self is consistent with the phenomenological
interpretation of action in the work of Alfred Schutz (1970) and his concern with
the "problem of releva nce. " Schutzian analysis of action may be described as an
attempt to integrate Weber's conception of meaning to a position which takes the
"entire status of meaning in social action" a nd examines the philosophical structure
of intention focusing on the " time structure of action" (Natanson, 1970: 104).5
Schutz' work is prinlarily a "discussion of motivational understanding of human
action" (Weigert, 1975: 101).
For Schutz, action and its content presents itself to the individual as a
series of existing and pre. pr,t experiences which are passing away to be replaced
by anticipated action guided by the interpretation of past action which is grasped

monothetically in terms of an act.

This interpretation of past action in terms of

its meaning, however, is not an attached element conferred to the act through
" predication." Instead, " meaning is bound to the very conception of action and
must be understood as vital to its formulation" (Natanson, 1970: 10). Therefore,
action and act exist in a dialectical relation one with the other. Each superimposes itself upon the other in terms of anticipated or phantasied action which is
future oriented and thus meaningful only in terms of individual consciousness projected in a corresponding act (Natanson, 1970: 104-106). Schutz also describes
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the process through which action obtains meaning in terms of motivational relevances
which are constituted by "in-order-to motives" and the "because-motive." These
motivational relevances exist in a mutual relation to interpretational relevances
and topical relevances. As the stock of knowledge--which represents the "sedimentation of various activities of our mind," guided by the operative relevances-is oriented to an object of interest, we are conscious of the topical relevances.

6

These topical relevances in turn provide an object of interest for the implementation of motivational releva nces consisting of the in-order-to motives which embody
the subjective intentionality of an actor and the because-motive which imputes
reflective meaning to the act.

The interpretational relevances, on the other hand,

serve to guide the mind in the perception of taken-for-granted phenomena or
topics which result in typifications.
These typifications are dependent upon a reflective grasp of meaning
which may be identified with either on-gOing experience (in terms of action) or
past experience through reflectivp meaning attached to an act. Meaning attached
to particular aspects of previous experiences may have an internalized "monothetic" interpretation which serves to facilitate an "habituated possession of
knowledge. " Weigert indicates that these "motivational relevances are, in
general, •sedimentations' or previous experiences, once topically or interpretationally relevant •••• which led to a permanent habitual possessioll of
knowle dge" (1975: 95).
This sedimentation of knowledge serves to circumvent the innovative
character of motivational relevan..:es as leading to new topical relevances. The
sedimentation of knowledge appears to the individual as a taken-for-granted reality

-13or typification which Sacks (1972) attributes to the interaction of characteristic
phenomena. The first element of the typlficatory structure consists of the
"consistency rule " which implies that the relation between two variables or
perceived types Is mediated and given placement through an informational item
or category conferring a taken-for-granted reality to particularistic identifications.
The second rule is referred to as the "economy rule" which serves to confer
practical relevance upon one interpretational device to the exclusion of other
explanatory mechanisms (1972: 31-34).7
The emphasis on monothetic meaning in relation to past action is evident
In the phenomenological approach to deviant beha vior. Lofland indicates that
during an escalation from the actor's pivotally normative interpretation of self
to the encapsulation of the actor's self into a deviant identity, the ordering of
one's biography into a consistent Gestalt facilitates the capacity of the individual
to view self and identity as deviant (1969: 148-149). During this shift in selfperception from

pivotal self in flux between deviance and normality to a Gestalt

interpretation (which adds essential meaning to one'!, biographical Identity) -past action Is redefined by imposing a monothetlc meaning to the building of
polythetic structure (biographical

e~riences)

and may result in the self-labeling

of the individual as a deviant with an accompanying "moral" essence.
The informal process of self-Iabeiing is iocated in the everyday relatlonships of intersubjective actions among interactive agents (Hawkins and Tiedeman,
1975: 75). Schur defines deviance In the following manner:
Human behavior is deviant to the extent that it comes to be
viewed as Involving a personally discreditable departure from

- 14a group's normative expectations, and it elicits interpersonal
or collective reactions that serve to 'isolate," 'treat," 'correct,'
or"punish " individuals engaged in such behavior (1970: 24),
This subjectivist definition of deviance represents an emphasis upon a
more symbolic and processual position than Becker's earlier formulation (1963: 9).
It was Becker who argued that deviant behavior is behavior which is so labeled.
Schur (1970) explicitly states what Becker implied when he suggested that "the
deviant is one to whom that label has been successfully applied" (Becke r, 1963: 9).
This conceptualization of deviance is dependent upon typifications of human action
in terms of the "dialectical relation of the 'ego' to the 'self. '" Natanson indicates
that the self is actually "the ego which has a concrete biography, a continuous
experience, and a specific orientation toward the future in terms of projects and
dispositions.

The self is the ego clothed with the garments of society" (1970: 17).

However, these projects and dispositions must not be interpreted to mean that the
self is an object of mere social manipulation.
the self stands

~r

Rather, as Blumer argues (1969: 64),

and against everyday interaction in a position of response

instead of mere reception.

The generalized other- -through which the self realizes

its meaning within the process of objectiflcation--should not be construed as a
"reified" construct. Following this "voluntaristic" emphasis on human activity,
Mennell shows that dominant patterns of behavior cannot be treated as reflections
of attitudes serving as "external stimuli which the individual passively absorbed
and replicated" (1974: 17). Mead's orientation to the selection of action objects
by the self is characterized in the following statement:
The human animal is an attentive animal . . • Our whole intelUgent
process seems to lie in the attention which is selective of certain

types of stimuli ••. Not only do We open the door to certain stimuli
and close It to others, but our attention is an organiZing as Well as
a selective• . . Our attention enables us to organize the field in
Which we are going to act (Mead, 1934: 25).

intuitive action Which is dependent to previous reactions.
Hinkle (J 972) Indicates that
I t is the "me" Which answers to the organized attitudes of others and
gives the "form " and structure to the self, while the "I" remains the
uncon Ventional, the novel, and the unpredictable (I 972: 97).

1975: 95).

Reactions to Stigma
The intelllalization of the e'QJectations of "significant others" may elicit
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-16serves as a "constellation of related ideas by means of which the individual malntalns, enhances, and defends the self" (1962: 85). CoopersmIth subsequently
presents self-protective mechanIsms as
•.• the Individual's capacity to define an event filled with negative
Implications and consequences In such a way that It does not detract
from hIs sense of worthIness, ablllty, cr power (1967: 37).
These self-protective components of the protective attitude enable the self
to redefine the essential nature of stigma. Otherwise, the individual might experience a "c risls " of the essential self.

Lofland, in the same c'Jntext, suggests that

an occurrence is disorienting only if the Actor has no category with
which effectively to designate the occurrence and no associated
repertoire of coping responses which he can activate . . • However,
it is unlikely that any Actor has a cognitive system so complex and
articulated that no possible occurrence can fall outside the range of
what he is already able to designate and manage. In this sense all
Actors are, in one way or another to one degree or another, vulnerable to disorientation (1969: 182).
Highly educated individuals, then, are more able to effectively discount the
validity of the devia n abel and to offer alternative explanations of their actions.
"Poorly educated, isolate d and parochial persons are simply m'l re likely to encounter
events whIch to them are inexplicable, baffling, bewildering, Incomprehensible and
the like." Such events would lead them to seek out definitions of events from others
(Lofland, 1969: 179-183).
In any event, a basic assumption of the interactlo:tist perspective is that in
instances where the Individual senses a stigmatizing reaction from a significant other,
he will attempt to remove self from exposure to this personally discrediting reaction.
Lofland considers substitution of this negative Other for a more accepting and
positive Other likely If the new significant other is helpful, and/or provides

-17" physical and emotional shelter and a rhetoric of defense" with "new possibilities
for positive action" (Lofland, 1969: 188). Kaplan in further discussion of the selfesteem motive states that "individuals will tend to behave in ways that will offer
maximum opportunity to develop, maintain, or improve positive self-attitudes"
(1975: 242).8 Hawkins and Tiedemann split the social identity into the self-image
("H:Jw does the Individual nominatively define himself? Does he conceive himself
as deviant or conventional?") and the self-esteem ("How does the individual feel
about his total self as he sees It? Does he have positive or negative feelings of
self-worth?") (1975: 242). This component (self-esteem) of the self corresponds
directly to Katz's (1972) notion of the "ontological status" of deviance and infers a
condition of negotiation of the subjective effects of the deviant label.
In instances where the individual experiences feelings of negative selfesteem (whether it is from public labeling or self-labeling through inte ractional
meanings drawn from symbolic, typified action) the actor becomes disoriented and
is susceptible to outside influences, These may result in an Internalization of
definitional meaning from others, which in tum may stabilize in a deviant identity
(HawkinS and Tiedemann, 1975: 245-246). Of particular interest in the discussion
of the self-esteem motive and its relation to identity transformation Is Schutz's
contention that the building of new biographical and typiflcatory experiences
necessitates the introduction of "new" categories or symbolic carriers of meaning.
He contends that "it is quite possible that a shift in the system of interpretational
relevances--as with the introduction of a new conceptualization--becomes the
starting point

fo ~'

building up a set of new motivational or topical relevances which

do not thus far pertain to the familiar stock of knowledge at hand" (1970: 70).

-18Schutz further argues that a strange or atypical event "if it is interesting enough"
will need to be investigated.

This would necessitate a set of topical relevances

leading to new motivational relevances. Also of importance to a discussion of
identity transformation is the theory of interpretational relevances which "furnish
the foundation of a theory of expectation and especially of problems of rationalization" (Schutz. 1970: 107).

This view indicates that interpretational relevances. as they

relate to explanations of social action through the perception of expectations. are
related to the Schutzian reality tra nsformation in which a vacancy caused by
dropping a topic from one level of reality is reconstructed "by means of systems
of relevances belonging to ot her levels of reality" (Schutz. 1970: 107).
This. then. accounts for the internalization of monothetic meaning attached
to a new concept of topical relevances which may be conveyed to the individual
through symbolic interaction with "carriers" of this reality centering primarily
upon the new topical relevance. Thus. the process of reality transformation may
be dependent upon the social identification of self with a "we-union" in which other
selves are members.

This leads to the partners and the new member " not feeling

separate and alo[1e. but of being 'together.' 'united.' 'at one' or 'merged'"
(Speigelberg. 1973: 142). This experience of a "we-union" is of central importance
to the maintenance of a subuniverse of meaning and the building of a deviant substructure through an ideological belief in the essential characteristics of the
phenomena.
Noting that "it is only in the communal context that a person can survive. "
Miyamoto (1970) indicates that this survival is dependent upon the self's viewing
of itself (through role taking) as deSirable (accomplished through evaluation).

- 19definable (seen through cognition), and gratifying (accomplished through the affective
mode of experience orientation). The most personal or intimate mode is that of
"evaluation" which exists in a "perceptual setting" where the self as an attitude
object serves to receive positive or negative evaluations from significant others
(Skidmore, 1975; 232-235). This mode of evaluation is similar to the "self-esteem "
motive as delineated by Hawkins and Tiedemann (1975) and is dependent upon
identification with a significant other.
In sum, the identification of self as deviant appears to have a curvilinear

effect on the individual's self-esteem In that during ambiguous circumstances
which violate typified conduct and are perceived to assert a deviant nature to the
actor, there is an initial period of low self-esteem.

However, if the individual

comes to settle into a deviant identity with a subsequent shifting of reference groups
or Significant others, assuming a positive status will restore feelings of selfworth and a heightening of s e lf-esteem (Hawkins and Tiedemann, 1975; 247).
The societal reaction perspective within the SOCiology of deviance has
developed from an emphasis on deviance as the result of rule-breaking behavior
to the inclusion of an orientation which takes the phenomena as a given or possible
state-of-being. As a result of efforts to derelfy the phenomena of deviance and
thereby to identify it as a non-pathological form of social behavior, the labeling
perspec tive has emphasized an "authentic" description of deviant reality as it
Is experienced by its members (Rock, 1972; 17).9 This wedding of a phenomenological emphasis on meaning and the problematic character of social de viance to
a structural approach which stresses the existence of subculture and marginality
has led the perspective to an orientation that embodies two heretofore oppOSing

-20theoretical traditions (Phillipson and Roche, 1974: 143). The penumbral area
between these two focusing points has been clarified through the application of the
concept of secondary deviation.

This concept directs attention to the individual's

commitment to a deviant role in which the primary act is considered a possible
constitutive and amplifying characteristic.
Sagarin and Kelly assert that the concept of secondary deviation (as it
relates to sexual deviance) is not a necessary component of a sound theoretical
framework within the labeling perspective (1975: 269). McAuliffe states that "there
is obviously nothing about many forms of deviance, especially the behavioral kind
which makes them inherently primary or secondary" (1975: 232).10 The use of
secondary deviation as a conceptual mechanism serves to relfy the processual
character of social deviance and has led to a belief in the "objective" existence of
some social phenomena. Sagarin suggests that by conceptualizing deviant identities
"as existing if one either commits the act or has a desire to do so, " scholars of
deviance imply that one may be a thief or any other categorical deviant simply by
having the desire to engage in the designated behavior (1975: 147).
The questioning of the applicability of the categorical existence of secondary
deviation to the processual identification of " self" as deviant, directs attention to
the ultimate ontological meaninglessness of the official categorization of a form of
behavior as deviant and denies the objective existence of "deviant" individuals.
However, this questioning fails to recognize the dialectical relation of the categorical imputation of deviance to the phenomenological "meaning content" of moral
imputations which lead some individuals to believe that they are deviant (Schur,
1975: 289).
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The Presentation of Deviant Reality
In his discussion of the practical activity of individuals In the process of

reality transfonnation. Antonio Gramsci indicates that a "critical understanding
of self takes place • • • through a struggle of political 'hegemonies' and of oppOSing
directions. first in the ethical field and then in that of politics proper. in order to
arrive at the working out at a higher level of one's own conception of reality"
(1972: 323), Gramsci presents his view by indicating that
the unity of theory and practice is not just a matter of mechanical
fact. but part of the historical process. whose elementary and
primiti ve phase is to be found in the sense of being" different" and
"apart." in an instinctive feeling of independence. and which
progresses to the level of real possession of a single and coherent
conception of the world (1972: 333).
There fore. a Marxian sociology of knowledge applied to the study of
deviant beha vior and deviance premises that self must be symbolically isolated to
facilitate a subsequent existential identification with "carriers" of alternative
symbolic realities (see Hamilton. 1974: 74).

T" c counter imputation of a positive status to the individual ' s feelings of
self-worth is a ccomplished with an alternative interpretation of the essential
characteristics of the behavior categorized as deviant by the "official" repre sentatlves of the symbolic universe. As such. the establislunent of a deviant identity
with a subsequent acceptance or generation of a positive ontological status is a
representation of the social phenomena referred to by Berger and Luc\emann as a
" subunlverse of meaning" (1967: 86-89). The subuniverse of meaning promulgates
a weltanschauung which is related to "concrete social interests of the group that
holds it" (1967: 96).

The establislunent of a subuniverse of meaning involves the

production of a body of knowledge existing in a dialectical relation to its social

-22base--the interests which generated the body of knowledge.

This subuniverse of

meaning also acts as a factor in social change which is dependent upon the ongoing activities of social agents who believe in the objectiveness of its essential
component. In the instance of behavior which is labeled as deviant by an "officiai
ban" with concomitant institutional and interpersonal sanctions. the production of
a subuniverse of meaning which imputes a positive state-of-being to actors faces
the special problem of dereification of the negative status ascribed to the action.
In instances whe re a group attempts a dereification of the reality of meaning
attached to a form of behavior. social marginality is observed to be a general
characteristic of that phenomenon by Berger and Pullberg. They indicate that
" such marginality may take a large number of different social forms--ethnic
(e. g. 'guest peoples'). religious (e. g. hermits and ascetics withdrawing from
society). moral (e.g. the marginal worlds creating by crime and vice). orpolitical
(e. g. political elites)" (1965: 209).
The marginality ascribed to individual!' in the rea lm of "crime" and
"vice" may result in the sedimentation of meaning structure into the solidification
of a deviant identity. The presentation of this reality by individuals whose behavior
is sanctioned by the perceived symbolic universe receives its concrete ma nifesta tion in the form of groups of individuals subscribiag to a central ideological position. The presentation of this "deviant" reality (embodying a subuniverse of
meaning) is an inherent characteristic of voluntary associations representing deviants
and comprising a more or less autonomous entity which affixes an ideological meaning to a form of behavior in terms of essentialism (see Sagarin. 1968).

-23In referring to the symbolic universe--within which there are many sub-

universes of meaning--Berger and Luclemann indicate that "the symbolic universe
orders and thereby legitimates everyday roles, priorities, and operating procedures
by placing them ••• In the context of the most general frame of reference conceivable" (1967: 99).

However, the subuniverse of meaning has the capacity to act back

on the collectivity which produced it (1967: 86). Any attempt to integrate a "deviant"
subuniverse of meaning necessitates a dereification of that behavior. This is
considered a necessity, since on a symbolic level behavior recognized as undesirable by the official definers of reality or significant others who impute a negative
meaning to the bebavlorcarries a negative ontological status which is objectively
defined by the symbolic universe.
The transition to the ascription of Significance to a different Other (giving

the deviance a positive status) involves a period of disorientation where the individual may be Influenced by several "others." This is a subjective process since
it depends on the human production of moral meaning and allows the inhabitants of
a particular subuniverse of meaning to deny the legitimacy of the negatively reifled
status of their behavior as a moral construction based upon "alienated" power
Interests.

The objectiveness of the categorical placement of the behavior as

"deviant" and "bad" is challenged with an alternative meaning which appears to be
subjective to the representatives and members of the symbolic universe, but which
at the same time is presented and believed to be objective (in terms of moral imputation) by the members who produce it.
Sallach,in his efforts to propose a "phenomenological Marxism;' indicates
that any attempt to change a prevailing Institution necessitates dereification.

-24The practical task of changing societal institutions means that:
(J) the member is no longer atomized, for, if he is to have a

chance at success, he is forced to Join with other members whose
interests he shares; (2) the member must view societal institutions
not as "imposed relevances"which form part of the objective
(reified) parameters of the everyday world, but as human-created
historical formulatiorls which must be understood concretely to be
changed (including an understanding of the humans who subjectively
administer such institutions); and, consequently, (3) the member
is required to learn that his "individuated" world is not totally subjective (but has been partially formed by objective processes, nor
are institutional relevances totally objective, but may be influenced
or changed by the member's conscious intervention) (1973: 36).

Summary
The process of substituting references to positive oriented significant others
is a humanly produced phenomena which necessitates a reflective consciousness
stripping the stigma of its ideological foundation and revealing its subjective nature.
The movement to a state-of-being which imputes a positive status to the behavior
is also subjective, since the individual may either change his behavior, enhance
his behavior, or dialectically interpret the imputation of stigma to produce an
alternative ideological position to that given by the symbolic universe.
Within a Marxian sociology of knowledge the process of identity transformation which was examined in this chapter represents a realm of qualitative social
praxis.

The denial of essentlal meanings conferred to categories through a

"fetichized morality" enables an "individual's" reality to be reconstituted through
processes of qualitative dereification within an "identity" transformation.
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CHAPTER II
ORGANIC INTELLEClUALS AND PHANTASIED SOCIAL ACTION:
ruE POSSIBILITIES OF LEGITIMATE SOCIAL PRAXIS

The possibility of a Marxian sociology of knowledge based upon an analysis
of the fonnation of social blocs or masses identifying with an ideological position is
addressed in this chapter. The Marxian sociology fonnulated by Antonio Gramsci
emphasized the notion of social praxis and intersubjective action and is related to
the fonnation of phenomenological "we-unions." These "we-unions" engage in
activities which serve to legitimate a deviant fonn of identity.
Voluntary associations are conceptualized as a manifestation of phenomenological "we-unions" and can be differentiated through their collective- representationof-self. The collective self is evident in the language community initiated by the
group towards the "public. " The orientation presented in this thesis does not
attempt to e

I "

te the success of the association but, following the recommenda-

tions of Henkin, fQcuses "upon the criteria of success used and defined by these
groups" (1970: 663). These criteria are revealed through ideological manifestations
which serve to symbolically integrate specific associations and provide the association's members with systems of relevance. These relevances tend to provide the
associations with legitimate possibilities for social praxis.
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-28Marxian Sociology of Knowledge
A division has been apparent historically within the field of the sociology of
knowledge.

The division centers around the Marxist notion of ideology and the

" phenomenological explanation of our social knowledge" (Martin, 1968: 334). The
orientation toward social order which utilizes the notion of ideology designates
political legitimacy and the imputation of "objectiveness" inherent in social rela-

tions as a product of ideological hegemony (Sallach, 1974: 38). Within this orientation, social and political stability is maintained through the legitimacy conferred
upon specific ideological views with the exclusion of others (Bridges, 1974 and
Sallach, 1974).
The phenomenological dimension of the sociology of knowledge, however,
approaches reality as an ever-changing social construction through its emphasis
upon the "subjective" perceptions of soc ial actors.

Within this frame of reference

the process of human externalization a s the anthropological base of society is
emphasized (Berger and Luckmann, 1967), and attention is directed toward the
imputation of " alienated power" as employed by social agents.

The phenomenological

emphasis serves to legitimize behavior through interactive leg itimations that value
"the transformation of existing institutions" (Miller, 1972: 123).
The first dimension (Ideology) emphasized the political aspects of hegemony
and its interrelation to the economic base of the capitalist state (Bridges, 1974).
This dimension of the sociology of knowledge is oriented toward the explanation of
structural arrangements which render unaccountable the Intentionality and the
"authenticity" of super-structural change by social agents, while it discounts the

- 2 9democratic state as a "phantasm " (Manders, 1975: 56-57). This approach toward
knowledge and ideology assumes a materialist base In both causal and historical
relation to tile super-structure whh..h is identified as the range of social relations
(Piccone, 1971).

This objeCtivist aSSUmption, drawn from the " scientific" Marx,

identifies knowledge or ideational systems which do not reflect a Marxist ontology (materialist) as a manifestation of "false consciousness" (Sallach, 1974).
The approach to Ma ocian SOCiology of knowledge embodied in this thesis
does not implement an objectivist orientation to consciousness but, instead, begins
with the Phenomenological assumption that all consciousness is "authentic"
(Lichtheim, 1964).

The refore, as Gramsci (1972) argues, Marxism becomes an

ideology which may be SUbjected to Phenomenological analysis.

The ideological

identification of Marxian characteristics aSSigned Specific modes of consciousness
are related to an orientation toward "SOCial praXis," instead of being oriented
toward super-structural relations to the "material" base.
I,

logical hegemony, then, is a reflexive phenomena th r vugl: which

symbolic meanings convey "POSSibilities" and orient actors toward legitimate
objects of consciousness. The se leg itimate objects of consciousness represent the
Structural phenomena Within a subuniverse of meaning (see Be rger and Luckmann,
1967: 76).

An analysis of a subuniverse of meaning entails a rigorous Phenomenological
interpretation of meaning Structure and its Outward manifestation in the fonn of an
ideology.

Shiner indicates that "phenomenological analysis ••• is not JUSt any

deSCription, but the description of 'essence' ••• the essences Phenomenologists

-30are talking about are not 'real' . . • they are Idealities belonging to the interplay of

consciousness and the world" (1 \169: 264).

A deviant subuniverse of meaning, then,

derives its origin from the internalization of stigma.

Individuals who perceive

themselves as deviant and internalize stigma "will interpret their acts in phenomen_
ally immediate terms," but "the first order constructs employed by these actors"
must be Open to Scrutiny by sociologists and not aCCepted as objective or esSential
(Rock, 1972: 149).

Rock SpeCifies the inherent incapacity of an orientation which

relies solely on first-order constructs to delineate the complex of categorical relations to negotiable moral Content
beca use no area of two-dimenSional space can be OCcupied by more
than one element, moral choices must be made between discrete
alternatives . . • Only a few deviancy sociologists Suggest that they
can support more than one set of "values" Simultaneously; that
'values" are not neatly separable from one another in all settings;
or that Contexts playa vital role in shaping which values will become salient and what significance they will acquire (1974: 146).
I1le analysis of meaning structures embodied in a subun:vet's e of meaning,
then, has r.elevance at two levels.

First, the level of intersubjective identification

which Is oriented to the relation of the individual "deviant" to other "deViants" or
sympathizers to that reality, and, second, the instrumental level that Orients attention to the perceived relation of that SpeCific subuniverse of meaning to the outSide
1
society.

There Is, therefore, a split between the phenomenological dimenSion of

the subuniverse of meaning which orients attention to the intersubjective embodiments of meanings with accompanying interactive elements and the ideological
dimenSion of the subuniverse of meaning Which orients conSideration to perceived
"structural" determinants of problems assocIated with the state-of-being embodied

in the subuniverse of meaning.

- 31The phenomenological dimension places emphasis on

c.'Je subjective effects of problems Involved In the identification of self as "deviant. "
The ideological dimension, on the other hand, emphasizes specific components of
the total ide ology (symbolic universe) as determinants of the deviant condition
(Stigma) through particularistic ideological configurations. 2 Krause (1969) presents
an adequate definition of "ideology: "
An ideology can be defined as any word, set of phrases, or text
which is used by one group ••. and directed at another group for
the purpose of POlitically organizing and activating the target group
to
behave in(1969:
a way548).
which will be in the ba Sic self-interest of the
proponents
These two conflicting perceptions of moral order (total ideOlogy and particular
ideology) are mediated by the political phenomena of the state with its explications
of formal rules protecting "civil rights. " As Speigelberg (1973: 44-45) has indicated,
"We-talk" when implemented to designate a "we-phenomena" Is dependent on the
inte r dependence of several partne rs perspective in a "we-union." Gussowand
Tracy Indicate that an ideological tmnsfOrmation of reality reqUires that "persons
Involved in the stigmatized condition are engaged in close and Sufficient prolonged
interaCtion " and that " the stigmatized are sufficiently free of daily encroaChment on
their lives by dissonant public views" (I971: 259).
The state, acting as a mediating agent between OPPOSing we-phenomena,
constitutes a dialectical entity which is dependent for its eXistence upon the externalizlng and intersubjective nature of Social beings. As Such, it is an embodiment
of alienated power.

Within this orientation perceptions of deviance become linked

to histOrical interpretation since the dialectical process of externalization conSists
of past events (acts), present action, and future or phantasied aCUon.

Wolfe, in

-32the delineation of a Marxian orientation vis-a-vis the state, Indicates that we must
view any theory of the capitalist state within the framework of alienated power
(1974: 155-157).4 The phenomena of aliena ted power when construed as the basis
of the modern state with Its accompanying institutions may be applied not only to the
modern capital1st state, but also to the state as an entity (see Bender, 1975: 33-52).
The state in this context becomes an exponent of "fetichized morality" since It
provides the ideological mechanisms to publicly ban or pubUcly enhance categorical
forms of social action.

Therefore, the investigation of alienated power relies upon

an analysis of ideology and hegemony since ideology is not only practiced but is also
lived in as If it were an objective reality (Bridges, 1974).

Viewing the structural

components of knowledge as ideology and hegemony--interplay of categorical "possibilities" to the individual self--definitions invariably hold the possibility of
generating opposition through reconstituting those imputations as "aUen. "
The consolidation of this "sense" of alienation (stigma) into a voluntary
,, ~

ciation enables the we-partners to promulgate alternative ideological forms.

These ideological foci represent orientations toward social change and are identified withln the Marxian sociology of knowledge specified herein as "phantasied"
social praxis. This conception is utilized from Antonio Gramsci's (1972) work
toward a Marxian sociology of knowledge. Gramscl takes as a basic premise the
necessity of a "democratic" state for the transformation of advanced capitalist
society and its accompanying hegemony of meaning (Salaminl, 1974).

For Gramsci,

hegemony is ideological (socio-cultural) first and only secondly a political fact
(Salamini, 1974: 368), Manders, however, asserts that

-33••• for Gramscl; and for us, the Ideological manipulation of consciousness Is most definitely a category of "social control." For
the political-coercive power of the capitalist state Is itself grounded
in the fact that most men and women grant it the right to monopolize
"legitimate" violence and to use it for the maintenance of the
capitalist order () 975: 58).
Gramsci stresses the belief that ideological hegemony is a necessary condltion for the seizure of state power and the creation of a new state.

The proletariat,

he contends, can and must become a dominant class before becoming a ruling class
(Salamini, ) 974: 368).5
Although Gramsci considers the manipulation of consciousness an aspect of
social control and order (Manders, 1975: 58), the knowledge systems attached to
these institutions are subjective, "human" products.
Objective always means " humanly objective" which corresponds
exactly to " historically subjective": in other words, objective would
mean "universally subjective. " Man knows objectively in so far as
knowledge is real for the whole human race historically unified in a
single unitary cultural system (Gramscl, 1972: 445).
Thus, for Gramsci, Marxism is an ideology since all knowledge short of its
unification into a " luma n" culture is ideological (Salamini, 1975: 67).

To Gramsci,

however, Marxism is the most encompassing " ideology of all, which does not aim
at mystifying human existence but is rather the expression of man 's human values"
(Salamini, 1974: 365).6
Bauman Interprets Gram!!ci ' s epistemological views of science and the
problem of values.
The way toward dismantling the foundations of the positivist
ascendancy does not lead through the questioning of the human
right to fuse interest with knowledge, but through challenging the
assumed monopoly of the "real" as the source of valid knowledge.
Which is not to say that all knowledge Is not valid; the " natural"
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laws of political economy Antonio Gramsci would say, hold well
in so far as the human masses behave in the ordlnary, routine,
monotonous, perfunctory way habitual in an alienated society; in
so far as they do, one can easily reply on the apparent repetitiousness of the observed phenomena as the foundation of a trustworthy knowledge. E.Jt the allegedly secure bssis goes topsyturvy the very moment that the masses [or a specific sub-altern
class) emerge from their comatose compliance and embark on
an "unusual," "unlawful," "improbable," "unwarranted"
adventure (1974: 169).
The basic shortcoming of Bauman' s analYSiS, however, lies in his inability
to Identify the process of " building" these masses which is also an important aspect
of Gramsci's SOCiology of knowledge. Gramsci realized that in order to have a
" mass" Ideology as an aspect of "total" culture, it must be recognized as man-made.
This proposition serves to tie its otherwise seeming "objectiveness" to history and,
therefore, to subjectivity, This, as we shall see, contrasts sharply with Mannheim's
conception of totality and ideology.

Mannheim, Gramsci and the Sociology of Knowledge
Karl Mannheim is considered a major proponent for the SOCiology of knowledge which exists outside the Marxian paradigm. His work (1936, 1943), howt;ver,
does not allow for the intersubjective production of knowledge through voluntaristic
action (Farberman, 1970),
Gramsci's view of knowledge as a product of intersubjective existence varies
from that of Mannheim,who identifies social thought and its accompanying reality
as "perspectivistic," in that it "derives from a standpoint located in the historical
and social context" (Miller, 1972: 123). Mannheim indicates that
• , • given values can always be interpreted both as a means of
adjustment to real situations, and as types of adjustment which

-35are directed by a particular Weltanschauung••. Justification of a type
of behavior as being an efficient piece of adjustment to a given situation
does not yet determine its being right or wrong (1943: 145-148).
Mannheim and Gmmsci differ importantly in their differentiation of knowledge and ideology.

For Gmmsci, all knowledge--includIng "scientific" knowledge--

is ideological, and will remain so, short of the cultuml and political unification of
the human race (Salamini, 1974; 1975). Mannheim, on the other hand, believes
that "scientific" knowledge as related to the natural sciences may achieve objectivity.
He replaces the quest for knowledge of the factual objectivity of social relations
within the "socially unattached intelligentsia" which appears to Mannheim "as the
predestined advocates of the intellectual interests of the whole" (Gerth and Bmmstedt,
1951 : IX).

Thus, for Mannheim social knowledge is ultimately based on second

order constructs of consciousness, and are, therefore, .. relative." However, it
may reach the " relational" level through the perspective of an unattached intellIgentsia which espouses knowledge that is not attached to a " class base. "
Salamini delineates the differences in the standpoints of Marx, Mannheim,
and Gramsci concerning the relation of ideology to knowledge .
Marx, Mannheim, and Gramsci all agree on the necessity of identifying knowledge and ideology. What sets them apart from each other
•.• is the notion of ideology. For Marx, ideology denotes a set of
ideas which reflects the social existence in a deformed, illusory, and
mystifying form. Gramsci gives to it a positive connotation and value.
Ideology Is " theory in dIrect relationship to human pmxls ; it is In
fact on the level of ideology that man becomes conscious of social
conflict (1974: 377).
Arguing against the notion of the objectivity of "bourgeois" sociological
methodology, Gramsci contends that "the validIty of such methodology presupposes
and is the result of the masses' lack of Critical consciousness and their political

-36passivity" (Salamlnl. 1974: 377; 1975: 72). The collective and critical cODsclousness of subaltern classes (subordinate social groups) takes place through Identiflcation with specific ideologies embodying "particular hegemonic force" (Gramsci.
1972: 332-334).

This indicates that Gramsci's delineation of the relation of civil

society to the state in terms of a "war of position"--a process which Gramsci
identifies with the "democratic" West--is opposed to a " war of manoevre"--which
he considers a characteristic of the East. "Class conflict becomes for Gramsci
the visible conflict of another profounder [sic] type of conflict. that of a confrontation of rival Weltanschauungen" (Salamini. 1974: 377).
While Mannheim believed social objectivity possible through the "synthesis
of partial perspectives" achieved by the "socially unattached intelligentsia" (Gerth
and Bramstedt. 1951: IX). Gramsci placed the struggle for objectivity on the level
of intersubjective existence.

The tendency toward the unification of social groups

is seen by Gramscl as continually interrupted by the ruling groups and "can only be
demonstrated when

' ,I

torical cycle is completed and that cycle culminates in a

success" (Gramscl. 1972: 55).

Marxian Sociology of Knowledge and the
Subuniverse of Meaning
Mannhelm's belief that the Imputation of perspective serves a mediating
function between the social setting and the content of thought (Miller. 1972: 128).
is characteristic of the sociology of deviance in relation to the prodUction of a subuniverse of meaning attached to a categorical. deviant act. A deviant Identity Is the
result of dialectical processes between the preconceptual (stigma) and categorical

-37(Identification of an object) dimensions of reality which represent a self-made phenomena molded through social-psychological processes.
Sa hay (1972) indicates that a basic limitation of Mannheim's SOCiology of
knowledge is Its inability to specify the nature of social contexts from which ideology
is constructed.
If it is possible to describe an ideology in Mannheimian terms, It
refers to the premise of the social context as the total determinant
of all action. So, without a specific formulation on the relationship
of the social context and ideology, i. e. which aspects in the general
social context relate to the defining element of ideology--even a
analytical description of actual, historical ideologies Is impossible.
This descriptive form is In fact the limit of Mannhelm's empirical
applicability of the whole of sociology of knowledge • . . In Mannheim
there is no analytic attempt to define the social context; in other
words, there is no methodology for analyzing the manifest reality
of ideologies and utopias (129).

A subunlverse of meaning is a consequence of the interplay of typified interactional
constructs which impute essential meanings to acts.

This imputation is accomplished

through the response of individuals to internalized stigma. Stigmatized individuals
may collectively define the source of intern ;7 ~ stigma by producing an alternative
essential meaning to the source of stigma (SpeJgelberg, 1973). This alternative
explanation of the deviant phenomena is a product of Gramscian " organic " intellectuals. These organic intellectuals give direction to the ideas and meanings
generated within the we-union of which they are members (Gramsci, 1972: 3).
The imputation of perspective orders social reality and provides an ontological frame of reference which in turn yields an ideological structure of meaning.
This structure of meaning or weltanschauung influences perceptions of social
reality through the promulgation of conceptual and explanatory mechanisms resulting
in the "objective" relevance of a particular reality to the pedagogy of its organic

-38intellectuals.

The direction which is promulgated by this association in turn pro-

vides a historical dimension to the problematic situation which initially exposed
the alienating condition.

This guidance is presented through the formulation of

topical and interpretative relevances for the collective-self.
The existence and examination of ideological structures of knowledge cannot
be related to an orientation towards social change which is dependent upon an analysis of the various r e lations between those ideological structures of knowledge.
Such an analysis should include an investigation of the alienated power of social
agents over other social agents on the level of political or rational-legal rules
involving the categorization of relations around a central or essential meaning conferred upon a specific phenomena.
Plummer (1975) points out the importance of an analysis of the relationship
of alienated power on the intersubjective level of legitimations to the political relations of relevance for authority structures and competing ideological viewpoints.
An important factor i uch analysis is that of power--where power
of one interactant ow ' it - other may have important consequences for
the reaction outcome. Whil e this is important on the level of routine
day-to-day life, it is e specially significant in understanding the work
of crusading groups such as moral entrepreneurs who campaign for
the control of pornography . . . and moral provocateurs who campaign
for Gay Liberation (55).
Scott and Franklin (1973) also indicate that "as distinct interest groups
evolve, organize , and disseminate infonnation, such action may be reflected in
our cultural values as portrayed by the mass media" (207).

Following this line of

inquiry, Warren and Johnson acknowledge the typified behavior patterns of deviant
realities and also call attention to the stigma which may be imputed to members of
this reality who seek to change their sense of identity.

-39-

Within the gay community, typifications of deviance include
people who do not drink at parties, homosexuals wishing to be
"cured" by psychiatrists • . . and those wishing to marry in order
to construct a front of respectability to present to the larger
society (1972: 81).
Thus, the legitimacy of the "community's" meaning structure is protected and its
members are given a guide to interaction.
In the investigation of deviance the essential meaning conferred upon a social
phenomena--designated politically as deviant or perceived as deviant through typified
interaction--involves an unequal set of power relations.

This constitutes an

alienated imputation of power by one social agent over others.

This imputation may

lead to an individualize d internalization of stigma.
The epistemological approach of the sociology of knowledge as employed in
the study of deviant phenomena must direct attention to the subjective and ideological
nature of categorical imputations and also lead to an analysis of deviant substructure
(Rock, 1972: 24-25). The analysis of "deviant" substructures and their accompanylng uni

r ses of meaning necessitates an examination of the categorical relevance

of Verstehen to phenomenalism as related to the production of a deviant subuniverse
of meaning.

That Is, one must consider the interplay of "identifiable" categories

of social action with the production of subjective meanings within these forms.
The theoretical components of an approach to deviance within the methodological framework of a Marxian sociology of knowledge are constituted by the
interactlonist approach's emphasis fln the societal reaction as the source of the
internalized stigma through categorical imputations of "difference," and a phenomenological emphasis on the meanings individuals attach to these reactions and

-40accompanying typified expectations of Others.

The experience of stigma as a

result of the imputation of "alienated power" and negative essence--with subsequent
interaction among other stigmatized individuals--leads to the possibility of a "weunion" conferring a positive essence upon the behavior and its identifying element.
The perceived nature of the source from which the stigma is to have originated

leads to an emphasis on either cultural and/or structural determinants of the stigma tized condition. An emphasis upon culture as a determinant of stigma is reflected
in a belief in the objective characteristics of social institutions, whereas an
emphasis upon social structure as the determinant of the stigma leads to a belief
in the subjective nature of social institutions with concomitantly identifiable ideological interests (Sallach, 1973: 36). Thus, the notion of "social praxis" serves as
a differentiating factor between "we-unions. "

The Manifestation of Deviant Substructure
Philosophically, the existence of a categorical and therefore relativlzed
conce ption of deviation is a necessary result of the congruity prinCiple which is
relied upon for any explanation since "unity" Is considered an a priori characterIstic of "understanding" (Shoham, 1974: 28).

The congruity principle Is evident

in the sociology of deviance through the symbolic Interactionist tenet that Individuals

react affinnativcly to situations which are perceived to embody positive implications
for seif-concept (see Hammersmith and Weinberg, 1973: 50) .and the phenomenological
assumption that social action yields typified patterns of behavior with accompanying
essential meanings, thus serving to unify experience. As a consequence, the
categorical internalization o( stigma may result in the collective identification of
individuals around a central and essential meaning conferred upon a form of
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Snclal actinn.

The ideological preSentation nf this collective Identification is a

Product of voluntary associations of IndiVIduals repreSenting and Identifying With
the deVIant phenomena.

These associations represent a Phenomenological response to the imputation
of a negative essence through categOrical identifications.

The tenet that social

change results from the interplay of structural and meaning components of Social
order (Smucker and ZiJderveld, 1970) is a characteristic of the eXistence of these
associations. Stigma is a result of the negative interplay of these two elements.
Hawkins and Tiedemann indicate that the process of deVIant identification involves
• .• (a) VIewing a behaVIor (VISibility), (b) recognizing it as deVIant,
which entails (c) the process of applying typifications of deVIance to
particular acts, (dl the attribute of intent to the actor••• (e) a
deciSion
on the transgressors true nature- -is he essentially deVIant?
(I975:
75).

The interplay of (c) and (e), Shown above, may result in the identification
and SOCial existence of a we-union of a collective and categOrical identification.
This sOlidification ·f indiVIduals into a collectiVIzed and deVIant identity leads to one
of two perceived ontological states-of-belng (Sagarln, 1969: 22-31).

if a negative

essence is imputed to the behaVIor by the we-union, the essential meaning espoused
by the association wlll place the responsibllity for the behavior on the indiVIdual.

A reinterpretation of responsibility which couchee the Source of deVIance In
the SOCialization or other processes-_i. e . , economic or political--and its accompany_
Ing universe of meaning wl\l lead to belief in the alienated characteristics of situational imputations based on typifications of deVIance.

These refuted Imputations by

the associations may be based on perceived social typifications which are eVIdent
through anticipated beha Vloral expectations.
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The examination of the subuniverse of meaning embodied in these categorical
Identifications involves the analysis of a weltanschauung which mediates, in a
Mannheimian sense, the interpretation of the social settings to content of thought.
The study of ideology employed by Mannheim, however, does not allow "reliance
on the face value of what an adversary professes" (Farberman, 1970: 3-4). Mannheim
clearly could not account for the existence of a we-union except through a form of
"conspiratorial theory. "

His treatment of man as a "collectivistic agency"

(Farberman, 1970: 6) whose "thought products are socio-existentially determined
in form and content" (Remmling, 1971 : 533) does not account for man as an interpersonal and innovative agent (Farberman, 1970: 6). Mannheim does not take into
account the possibility that ideologies may be presented as embodiments of a group's
phenomenologically perceived nature.
Gramsci, on the other hand, identifies the central question in the relatlonship of social reality to modern social theory and Its historical approach in the
following manner.
Can modern soc ia l theory be in opposition to the "spolltaneous"
feelings of the masses? ("Spontaneous" in the ser,se that they are
not the result of any systematic educational acti.vity or the product
of an already conscious leading group, but have been formed
through everyday experience illuminated by "commonsense" ).
It cannot be in OPPOSition to them. Between the two there is a
"quantitative" difference of degree, not one of quality. A
reciprocal " reduction" so to speak, a passagf! from one to the
othe r and vice versa, must be possi.ble (1972: 199 ).
To carry out a phenomenological examination of Ideology and its accompanying
ontological relevance, Gramsci's focus upon "subaltern classes" and their accompanying organic intellectuals must be utilized within a Marxian SOCiology of knowledge.
These subaltern classes are formal representations of subuniverses of meaning

-43which Identify deviance as a result of cultural or soclo-structural factors.

In the

former, the relation between the individual and the community undergoes relficatlon
since the individual is abstracted from the intersubjective context of association. In
the latter, the relation of the individual to the community reflects a processural and
intersubjective dependency that is projected in phantasied social praxis. Additionally, the orientation towards social change for these relations may be conjunctural
or organic.
Conjunctural relations promulgate institutional referents as the determining
source of the alienated power. Organic phenome na specify " systemic s ources" of
alienated power. Conjunctural, organic, and reified subaltern classes, therefore,
retain their definitional status through interpretative relevance structures which
define the relation of the community to outside social structure.

Intersubjective

"we-unions" then may be heuristically divided into types which reflect va rying
"idealized" relations between the community and outside sources of impOSition.
These idealized relations, however, also represent orientations towards change
which reflect various ni odalities of phantasied social praxis . The consolidation of
these modes of social praxis, howeve r, is contingent upon these subaltern classes'
ability to produce organiC intellectuals who must be distinguished from traditional
Intelle ctuals . Gramsci divided intellectuals Into two groups according to the
function the y serve in soc ie ty.
In the first place there are the "traditional" profeSSional
intellectuals, literary, scientific and so on, whose position in
the interstices of society has a certain inter-class aura about It
but derives ultimately from past and present class relations and
conceals an attachment to various historical class formations.
Secondly, there are the "organic" Intellectuals, the thinking and
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organizing element of a patticular fundamental social class.
These organic intellectuals are distinguished less by their
profession .•• than by their function in directing the ideas
and aspirations of the class to which they organically belong
(1972: 3).
This identification of the function of intellectuals makes eVident the professional
intellectual's dependency upon the social structure. Therefore, the task of professional intellectuals within a Marxian sociology of knowledge must assume a mediating
nature for the organic intellectual who represents subaltern groups.
The professional intellectual must relate to the subaltern group as a system
of relevance structures rather than assuming it to be a product of subjective intentionality.

Following a methodological program of this sott will enable the investi-

gator to appreciate the social philosophy inherent to Gramsci 's work.

For Gramsci,

philosopby as intellectual order relates to and supercedes common sense as criticism and "in this sense it coinCides with 'good' as opposed to 'common' sense"
(1972: 325-326). It appears that whereas "common sense identifies the exact cause,
simple and to hand, and does not let itself be distracted by fancy quibbles and
psuedo- profound, psuedo-scientific metaphys ical mumbo- jumbo, " philosophy points
to the revelation of the "good" based upon a coherent view of historical l"eality
(GramsCi, 1972: 348). This relation between the "statics" of common sense and
the critical, dynamic function of philosophy is a dialectical one in which common
sense is guided by "good sense" of organic origin (Gramsci, 1972: 330). Gramsci
indicates that any attempt by a subordinate group to achieve dominance depends
upon the formation of organic intellectuals who are products of the commonsensical
problems of the specific group.

-45One of the most Important characteristics of any group that
Is developing towards dominance is Its struggle to assimllate
and to conquer " Ideologically" the traditional Intellectuals, but
this assimilation and conquest Is made quicker and more efficasclous the more [he group in question succeeds in simultaneously ela borating Its own organic intellectuals (1972: 1m.
The intersubjective we-union serves as a practical referent for the gap
between idealist philosophy and everyday, practico-activity through social praxis.
The form of social praxis will depend upon the definition of the soclo-political
deviance promulgated by the group through Its ideological topical relevance. Weigert
indicates that "types of social action impose to;>ical relevances which focus the
attention of actors" (1975: 92).
The relation of the we-union to the "outside" society is delineated through
the implementation of interpretative relevances which represent " a learned process
of organizing past experiences for present action" (Weigert, 1975: 93). These two
systems of relevance (topical and interpretative) depend upon motivational relevances for the explanation of social action.

However, In the study of ideological

manifestations within a subuniverse of meaning we are interested in the collectivized
presentation of the essential self.

For this reason, a delineation of the motivational

relevance systems of a group is seemingly impractical if not impossible since the s e
relevances depend upon individual and Situational decis ions to act.

The structuring

of motivational relevances represents a domain of investigation for ethnomethodology.
The specific relevance of this assertion will be discussed in the conclusions of the
thesis.
On the level of Ideology, the topical relevance of a group refers to the
collective definition of the deviant condition which involves a value orientation that
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The reconStitution of meaning for a stigmatized Identity may remain on and
become reified In the Intersubjective level.

It may be legitimated to the public,

however, through a phenomenological commitment to social praxis. This process
places It 10 a processural and humanistic orientation to social change.

FOOTNOTES

ISagarin (1969: 39) di vides voluntary associations into expressive and
instrumental types which parallel these two relevance orientations.
2 The "methodological" components of [he sociology of knowledge of Ka rl
Mannheim (total and particularistic ideologies) are discussed below.
3Although deviant groups may not be considered proletarian in an orthodox
Marxian sense and may be more reflective of Marx's lumpenproletariat, the conflict generated by an attempt to transform perceived structural determinants of
reality may lead to an ideological identification with other groups of a proletarian
nature (see Taylor, 1973: 23-24) (Gram sci, 1972: 204-205).
4, 'olfe, in referring to the relationship of a Ma rxist theory of the state to
the concept of "alienated power" (an inherent characte r istic of a "we-union" )
suggests that
one of the first tasks of a Marxist theory of the state must.
be the assertion of the primacy of neither (base/superstructure);
only that of the empirical reality of the capitalist state must be
asserted. To understand it means not fitting it into preestablished categories but modifying the categories to explain it.
To do otherwise is to reify and mystify Marxism, hence to
render it conservative, and thereby destroy its potentiality
(1974: 138).
5Gramsci considered the formation of an "organic" state as a result of
human efforts to t ransform the existing power structure with the accompanying
reality throug " j "cultural" unification of the masses. However, this unification
wa s considered a result of human praxis through which groups united to define the
source of existential problems and move toward their reconciliation.
This serves to focus attention upon groups of lumpenproletariat as well as
proletarian groups which struggle to overcome "subjectively" defined problems
(see Ta ylor, 1973; and Horowitz, et. al., 1968).
Socialist revolutions have failed and will continue to fail, Gramsci
contends, a s long as thlO! subjective componpnts of Marxist theory
are deficient. In other words, proletarian revolution is not the
result of the immaturity of the working class and the nonrlpeness
of the obje.:tive conditions, rather it is the result of a lack of
subjective realization of the ripeness of objective conditions for
socialist transformation. It is precisely the insistence on such
subjective components of Marxism that differentiates Gramsci
from Lenin (Salamini, 1974: 363).
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- 496Totalization processes involve the prodUCtion of a metaphysical framework
in which language serves as a base and "functions as a continuous determinant of
the perceptual-conceptual processes and the weltanschauung of the members of
the language community" (Henzler, 1966; 175).

CHAPTER III
THE SUBSTRUClURE OF HOMOSEXUALITY

Homosexuality is analyzed within this chapter as a specific manifestation
of a subuniverse of meaning which cannot be reduced to either psycho logistic or
bio!ogistic determinism. A critique of psycho-analysis and theories of biological
etiology is given which concentrates upon these approaches' tendency towards abstracting the individual from the contextual dimension of social action. Subsequently.
a more promising approach is proffered which concentrates its analysis upon homosexuality as a phenomena which may be acquired not only from childhood socialization but. also. as an outcome of adult socialization through ideological primary
groups. llle se groups represent a negotiable dimension of order which functions
as an internal structuring mechanism for the voluntary association. Thus. homosexuality can be lnntfu lly explored within a Marxian soc iology of knowledge through
an investigation of tho themes of relevance constituted by a collective-presentatIonof-self.

Homosexuality
West (1967) has shown that homosexuals usually do not conceive of the possibility for changing their propensity toward specific sexual objects of a homosexual
nature to those of a heterosexual nature.

This view concentrates upon homosexuality

as a state-of-being (Hooker. 1965). Sagarin. however. views this as a reification
of identity.
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The re is no such thing as a homosexual, for such a concept is
a relfication, an a rtificially created e ntity that has no basis in
reality . . • The desires constitute feeling, the acts constitute
doing, but neither is being (1973: 10).
The literature concerning the homosexual and homosexuality abounds with
contradictions ideologlcally bound to their advocates.

However, before entering

into a discussion of the basic disagreements in th'i' field concerning homosexuality
and its effect on individuals, the phe nomena must be nominatively defined. A definition of homose xuality will of necessity contain two basic elements. These are best
drawn from Acosta.
On the one ha nd, some authors . . . consider individuals to be homos e xual if they so identify themselve s and if their sexual desires and
overt sexual behavior are both predominantly directed to members
of the same sex. On the other hand, some . . . consider a dominant
fantasy or sexual desire for members of the same sex as evidence
of homosexuality without the requirement of overt sexual behavior
(1975: 10).
Utilizing this definition the relation of the two theoretical elements contained
in, or conceptualized as, an identity and sustaine d through typified interaction among
significant othe r s claiming a similar definition may be delinlited. The second
component of Acosta's formulation a llows for the existence of "secret deviance."
in relation to identity the notion of " latency" leads to belief in a reified state-ofbeing- - i. e ., constitutional homosexuality.
The concept of secondary deviation as an ideal type is contained in Acosta ' s
definition since there is typified behavior and being a latent deviant possibly becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, the homosexual is nominatively defined as
an individual whose sexual orientation is predominantiy directed toward members
of the same sex and who believes this activity to be an essential indication

-52of sexual identity.

This definition does not reify the individual's Identity since the

behavioral component Is related to the identlficatlonal component which Involves the
guidance of situationally enacted behavior.
This "guidance" is related theoreticall y to Shutz's emphasis on " relevances"
and the various dimensions of the "problem of relevance" in relation to existential
experience. Shutz's diSCUSsion of the process through which action obtains meaning
makes eVident a circular or dialectical relation among the motivational, interpretational, and topical relevances which he construes as either "imposed" or "intrinsic"
to consequent action (Weigert, 1975: 94). Shutz (1970) does not account for the
reaction of the individual through the production of "intrinsic relevances" since an
excursion into this question would involve a positivistic methodology or "psychologistlc" reductionism.

However, this should not by necessity be considered a

detraction from his theoret/cal development since the cognitive and historical
"PoSsibilities" of action are open to Inquiry.

That is, the sociological investigator

can attempt to group phenomenologically the "systems of motivational relevance
which determine and define one's interests" (Weigert, 1975: 94). Cotton presents
an example of this aspect of the homosexual milieu.
In hete rosexual society the two sexes automatically provide many
status distinctions by which to arrange peer-group, sexual and
marital relationships. Since homosexuals operate primarily in
a one-gender milieu, there does not eXist such a natural means
of making status distinctions •• • Deviant groups attempt to set
up value systems and status distinctions parallel to those in the
larger society (1972: 322).

From a more radical stance, Milligan argues that
when homosexuals do "marry" each other they unwittingly turn
marriage into a charade. Gay marriages performed by the

- 53-

Metropolitan Community Church in the U.S.A. are a grisly
parody of heterosexual ceremonies. Far from making homosexuality acceptable, they demonstrate the absurdity of
marriage and challenge the assumptions that the inStitution
rests upon (1973: 3).
Thus, the interaction of homosexuals within their community is patterned
and typified through an outward manifestation which mal: reflect Structural qualities
of the heterosexual World.

This characteristic element of the interaction among

homosexuals is considered for the purposes of this thesis as an " identificational"
or expressive element of the homosexual phenomena.

These expressive character_

istics of a subuniverse of meaning function as mechanisms of inte rna I legitimation
and constitute a hegemonic device.
The implementation of systems of relevance which serve to legitimize
identity through "parallel" forms of symbolic action are repreSentations of "imposed
relevances" which function as guides for interaction.

These imposed relevances

may be of a reified nature, or they may be manifestations of processural orienta_
tions tOWard reality transformation as a "human" enterprise. A reifled imposed
relevance leads to a deviant identification which is the result of cultural processes
and as such is not related to a commitment to social change. An emphasis on the
hum a n dimension of the process of deviance creation, however, is reflected in
the Suggestion that specific socio-Structural phenomena act as the source of imposition.

In order to clarify this distinction, it is necessary to discuss the predominant

orientations used in the investigation of homosexuality.

Upon close examination, it

is evident that these approaches have theoretically "abstracted" the homosexual
individual from the social-milieu wherein the experiential nature of his or her
homosexuality emerged.

-54Psycho-Analytic Theory
Among the most influe ntial theoretical orientations to homosexuality has been
the psycho-analytic approach.

This orientation has traditionally stressed deficient

parent- child relationships as the early source of homosexuality In both males and
females (Acosta. 1975: 14). The major weakness of this approach lies In the
general inadequacy of the testability of psycho-analytic assumptions.

For example.

Bieber. et. al •• (1962) found that mothers of homosexuals. In accord with psychoanalytic hypotheses. are often seductive and intimate while the individual's father
if usually hostile and detached.

However. Plummer has argued that

several studies have demonstrated how easy it Is to plunge a
knife right into the heart of most homosexual research (BIeber
notwithstanding) on methodological grounds (1975: 123).
In reference to the epistemological nature of psychoanalysis. Shutz Indicates
that the assumption behind the approach is akin to the conception of "smaller
perception" in Leibniz's philosoJily. Smaller perceptions are phenomena which can
never be apperceived but eXist instead In an unidentifiable relation to other
phenomenon.
The content of what Freud calls subconscious life. however. can
be virtually thematized. and the analytic technique consists first
in bringing the hidden motive of the neurotic behavior into the
horizontal field of consciousness. and finally making it its thematic
kernel. To the patient. his neurotic behavior with Its undisclosed
motive is the theme related to an outer level of his personality.
The hidden counterpart In a deeper level of his personality is
theoretically concerned with what psycho-analytical terminology
has baptized the "subconscious motive" of such behavior (1970: 13).
Psycho-analytic theory allows the Individual to "freely associate" thl'ough
the oscillation of the thematic field at random from one level of the personality to
another (Schutz. 1970: 15). The theoretical base of this approach Is constructed

-55through the relation of an ideal-typical or reifled state-of-beingwhich serves to
t.hematize at the most elttreme level the "good" and the "evil" (desirable and undesirable).

The manifestation of a sense of neurosis (stigma or feeling of rejection) is an

act of faith on the individual's part since the value necessitating the rejection depends
upon imputations from others. Berger (1965) has likened the psycho-.nalytic role to
that of a modern-day priest.

Following from this observation it does not appear

surprising that "it seems [thatJalmost any combination of family factors has been
shown at some time to have aetological links" to homosexual proclivities and
homosexuality (Plummer, 1975: 125).

Biological Etiology
In addition to the psycho-analytic approach for e xplanation of the etiology of
homosexuality there has been intere st in biological factors as they may influence
homosexual behavior.

The assumption underlying Kinsey's (1948) widely acclaimed

study was that homosexual conduct is a biological variant; and, thus, it conferred a
normative nature to the homosexual (Socarides, 1975: 1l5). The interpretation of
the Kinsey Report as a measure of homosexuality and homosexual behavior has been
questioned by several investigators, who, in turn, have been criticized by others.
Karlen (1971) points out the positive qualities of the Kinsey statistics, yet Sagarin
suggests that
with all his reading, there is no sign that Karlen ever examined
the report (largely though not entirely favorable) of Kinsey's
volume on males made by a special committee of the American
Statistical Association (1973: 9).
Tripp (1975: 233-235) refers to critics of the report--speciflcally the
American Statistical Association- -as instigating action against the Kinsey Report
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discredit the report and its statistics.
Paul Gabbard, the head of the Institute for Sex Research, has acknowledged
that "distortion may have arisen from the large number of prisoners who had been
part of the sample" particularly in the grade 8 through 12 educational level (Kinsey,
1948: 3). A basic criticism of Kinsey's work, which established the idea of an
existing "heterosexual-homosexual" continuum, is presented by Bergler,lWto indicates
that Kinsey "takes his human guinea pigs [volunteers] for ideaUsts who volunteered
only for the purpose of furthering scientific research [and] that the chief appeal [for
this volunteering] has been altruistic. " (1969: 272).
The ultimate validity of Kinsey and his colleagues' assumptions and their
methodological procedures are not of primary importance here.

The importance of

the Kinsey Report for this thesis lies in its social-psychological impact and its use
as a device for legitimation of homosexual beha vior.

However, one important

shortcoming of the theoretical approach of the Kinsey Report should be mentioned.
Kardiner (1954 ) expresses this concern well.
Dr. Kinsey's procedure would be quite valid If he were studying
variations in the anatomical structure of ants. Statistics here
would show variations in biological make-up. In the study of
sexual behavior, however, statistical variations are only one
small part of the total study on the baSis of which one could
venture an interpretation. The chief reason for this is that
sexual behavior is predominantly a motivated field (cited in
Soca rides, 1975: 114).
In his review of the various etiological orientations toward homosexuality
Acosta indicates that "some genetic, chromosomal, or honnal factors may function
to some degree in the onset of homosexual behavior" (1975: 13). Acosta notes,
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contention. At the time of this writing, a biological explanation seems Inadequate
for providing a full explanation of homosexuality.

Social-Psychological Explanations
The social learning approach to the explanation of homosexual activity holds
that "psycho-analytic explanations may account for the development of homosexuality
in a minority of homosexuals but not the majority" (Plummer, 1975: 17). This
psycho- analytic theoretical orientation has been generally considered relevant when
attention is directed toward childhood experiences and the relationship of these
experiences to the formation of the self-concept (Plummer, 1975: 131).
Plummer (1975: 130-131) advances a more voluntaristic approach to the
study of homosexuality.

He views the sexual role as an ever-changing perceptual phe-

nomena in constant transformation and interpretation. Although a connection between
early childhood experiences and homosexuality may be inferred, adult socialization
into sexual r (\''')s is also important. The approach presented by Plummer does not
separate the ma nife~ tation of homosexual activity from its surrounding environment.
Rates of homosexuality as well as attendant meanings became the focusing orientations
of this approach when adult as well as childhood processes of socialization and
meaning internalization is emphasized.

The indIvidual 's commitment to the deViant

role and the interrelation of this sense of commitment to outside structures thus
become important.
Following from the concern with the influence of social structures upon homosexual behavior and homosexuality, Ashworth and Walker present a theoretical
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(1972: 146). This Involves the question of a "symmetry of accessibility between
genders" (Plummer, 1975: 128) and the role of social structures In the obstruction
of symmetrical accessibility (Ashworth and Walker, 1972: 148).

From this theo-

retlcal orientation, structural elements from the outside society as well as elements
of differentiation and problematic identification are important for the stabilization
of sexual identity in either a conventional or a deviant pattern. Thus, the deviant
subuniverse of meaning can militate against access to erotic heterosexual gratification through an hegemony of meanings embodied in a substructure. Sagarin argues
that
within the homophile organizations, members sneer at anyone
who expresses an interest in changing. They remark pessimistically that such a person will soon be back in the fold
(1969: lOS).
Therefore, voluntary associations present structural impositions of meaning
to the individual member in rei"'

Jill

to his or her sexual identity. Members of

voluntary associations of homosexuals, however, cannot be considered "average"
homosexuals since the investigator does not know what percentage of the total homosexual population they represent.

This methodological problem is a direct result of

the phenomena of secret deviance. Several comparisons, however, may be drawn
concerning public homosexuality and private or secret homosexuals.
Harry's study of urbanization and homosexuality which concentrated on the
gay bar attempts to show the Interrelation between a public institution and secret
homosexuals.

His study represents the first source of data on a national scale for
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an object of dispute among researchers in the area of homosexuality.

Hooker (1965\

contends that clients of gay bars represent a small minority of the homl)sexual
population with non-bar-going homosexuals finding satisfaction in more personal
kinds I)f intemction.

Weinberg (1970: 319\. however. suggests that bar-going homo-

sexuals constitute a substantial portion of the total homosexual population.

Ha rry

accounts for the possibility of the gay-bar as a centmlizing institution of the homosexual community by showing that gay bars tend to be differentiated into types which
have distinctive characteristics:
••. Bars catering to the younger gays are much more common
than those catering to older gays. Presumably. the reasons for
this are due to the older gay ' s reduced frequency of bar attendance
• • • The greater mrlty of Older than Younger gay bars may be
also partly due to the tendency of the older gay to more widely
distribute his bar attendance among a variety of bar types Including
Young gay bars. Thus. as the gay ages. he may diversify hi s lifestyle activities (1974: 244) .
•1.< r1e bate centers on the symbolic attributes 'If the gay-bar and its relation

tl) the hom osexual community.

If the patrons of the bar are typical h'lmosexuais.

then the stratiflcatil)n revealed by Ha rry might reflect some structural cha racteristlcs of the homosexual community.

However. if the bar patrons and members I)f

homosexual organizations are n'lt representative of the homl)sexual population. investigators of the Invisible side of the homosexual world may be engaged In a fruitless
search.

For example. Cotton has shown that many hl)mosexuals exist In small. tight.

social units which replace the "gay-bar"; but. Interestingly. their "friends" seldom
have sex with a member of the clique.

He provides an illustration.

-60You just don't have sex with your friends, that's all. if you have
someone who Is a lover, of course you Introduce him to your
friends, and take him to parties, etc. But if he starts to get into
the group, somehow you seem to lose Interest (1972: 317).
Whereas, one might argue that the older and more settled homosexual IIfestyle and sexual orientation is not found among homosexuals who seek attention from
psychiatrists and other therapists, Cotton depicts these older homosexuals' relationships as primarily being based upon companionship designed for mutual economic
support. The world of the secret homosexual revolves around tight-knit cohesive
groups of friends characterized by Cotton as "disillusioned about ever being able to
maintain [a] permanent relationship, much less [to be able] to set up living arrangements with a lover" (1972: 313). These tight-knit groups of friends among secret
homosexuals appear to be related to a phenomena categorized by Marx and Holzner
as "ideological primary groups. " Ideological primary groups, assert Marx and
Holzner, "are informal, unstructured collectivities s ufficiently small for members
to have direct, face-to-face relations and for each member to have an opportunity

c participate at every meeting" (1975: 316). These groups give individuals an opporrun ity to meet in order to share common experiences which lead to primary group
solidarity. The nature of the study of such groups or gatherings In the homosexual
community necessitates a grounding in ethnographic epistemology since membership
and problem solving through the exchange of experiences is constantly changing.
Marx and Holzner suggest that the central notion in the Ideological primary group's
development is usually a shared sense of injustice (1975: 316).
However, ideological primary groups represent only the intersubJective
realm of the deviant group. The ideological primary group, in this sense, constitutes
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stigma or oppression). A logical extension of this idea Is the notion that these
Ideological primary groups serve as a focus for significant others.

In turn, this

interaction might lead to and continually facilitate identification with established
groups or voluntary associations of homosexuals with a formulated ideology. An
example of a " pure" expressive association is the voluntary association of homosexuals known as Christopher Street West Association. As their chairperson
indicates:
Our organization has one primary function and that is to put on
a parade and/or carnival once a year. While we do meet twelve
months out of the year to plan for this event and to keep ourselves up on currellt political activities which directly affect the
Gay Community, we do not put out a newsletter. Most of our
members are involved in other groups/organizations and keep
us up to date (Personal Communication: March IS, 1976).
The interrelation of life-styles among confirmed homosexuals is described
by Cotton as a counter-culture (1972: 311).

He goes nn to suggest that

deviant groups attempt to set up value systems and status
distinctions parallel to those in the larger society. When for
a pa rticula r reason it is impossible to follow the example of the
dominent society in detai l, a new form or procedure or value
system, serving a specific need, will emerge based on possible
criteria (1972 : 322).
It is at this point that Cotton closes off his analysis.

His frame of reference

Ul insufficient for an analysis of a counter-culture or of the production of alternative
institutions as addressed in this thesis.

Cotton's analysis deals only with the imposi-

tion of the expectations taken from the outside society and can be compared to the
earlier Dotion of subculture formulated by Cohen (1955). The legitimations constructed
by these subcultures is interpreted as pre-determined from values embodied in the
outSide culture. Cotton does not consider the possibility of qualitative dereification
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Sagarin emphasizes a more general view of voluntary associations and argues
that the fundamental purpose of these associations is one of proselytizatlon. He also
asserts that this " nature" will bring defeat to the homophile movement.
As it's constituted now, it must continue at war both with itself
and the world of science, its ideology has led it into a cui de sac
where, despite itself, it has become a proselytizer forSexua-ldeviation. As such, the homophile movement cannot be successful in reorienting the public ' s attitude toward, or its image of,
the homosexual in society (1969: 110).
The question of whe ther voluntary associations representing homosexuality
act as proselytizing agents is difficult to address due to secret homosexuality'S
category, which must be addressed in any study of homosexuality.

However, a

possible solution to this problem may be found in a phenomenological approach to tbe
concept of commitment and the notion of the ideological primary g r oup. Stanage
indicates that a
? erson is committing himself whenever he projects himself through
choices, and this gives himself over to something or to someone
e ve n when none of this is uttered or covert behavior. A man commits himself whenever his very character is said to be given over
to something or to someone else. A person's commitment begins
even at the point where he becomes conscious of a situation in volving the necessity for him to choose, whatever his overt course
of action might be eventually (1970: 34-35).
The concept of commitment when applied to the ideological manifestation of voluntary
associations yields an explanation for the divergence of particular associations from
parallel institutional manifestations as they relate to " outside" phenomena.
As noted above, the analysis of Cotton (1972) fails to account for the institutiona! structures of the homosexual "counter-culture" which diverge from the
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He presents no

theoretical explanation for a group finding It "Impossible to follow the e xample of
the dominant society" (1972: 322).

He overlooks the phenomenological possibility

than an Individua l may deve lop an essential perception of self which serves to confer
authenticity to certain topical phenome na and interpretative relevances.

This orien-

tation to the homosexual community supports Sagarin's argument which essentially
placed all organizations of deviants in a proselytizing role,

However, if the r e lation

of the ideological prim ary group to the voluntary association is examined analytically,
rather than psychologically, the relations of the individual components of the subuniverse may be methodologically explored. Although the research strategies of
ethnomethodology are not employed in this theSis, an analytical approach to ideology
which retains the possibility for the utilization of ethnomethodology's focu s upon
negotiation a s the structuring mechanism for social order is utilized. Antecedent to
this, the re la tion of the ide ological primary group to the voluntary association must
be systematically explore d.

The Ideological Primary Group and Voluntary Associations
In the concluding remarks of his work, Odd Man in, Sagarin provide s an
account of the r e lationship of volunta ry associations of deviants to the ideological
presentation of

th~

collective-self which these associations proffer toward the " out-

side" society. He indicates that
deviants, particularly those who are victims without being victimizers,
have found In sociologists a group anxious to express their friend s hip
and unders tanding.
It is not expected, then, that interneCine battles for power and
strong arm methods involving threats and even blackmail should have
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image that it wishes the world to accept. • • "The history of the
group is carefully concealed, ideological distortion is glossed over,
and successes exaggerated (1969: 234).
Similarly, in an earlier work Sagarin argues that "since an individual deviant may
have a way of life totally inconsistent with the image being projected, this projection,
rather than alleviate his inner conflicts and offer him self-support, may very well
make him feel unworthy even of the standards within the deviant group·· (1968: 93).
Sagarin's orientation toward the collective-presentation-of-self for voluntary associations of deviants assumes a consensus among ideological participants within the
association.

Yet the conflictual basis of the ideological presentation-of-self simply

becomes a topic for further research.

Therefore, the ideological themes formally

put forth by the association must be considered as products of a process of negotiation,

Through this process of negotiation the " ideals" of the group become thema-

tized as "phantasied orientations" toward legitimate social praxis for the
collective- self.
Sagarin (1968; 1969) does not approach the conflict of groups within the
voluntary association in an analytical mode of conceptualization and thereby fails to
acknowledge the possibility that a collective-presentation-of-self might be authentic
to the individual member, even though the individual may not agree with the idealization that the association projects. Under close scrutiny, however, the relation
of the ideological primary group to the voluntary association of deviants demonstrates the pOSSibility of an "authentic" presentation of the collective-self which
legitimates the particular ideal of pressing for a transformation in structural
arrangements. "The possibility of this authenticity lies in discursive validation of
the voluntary association's ideological presentation. That is, the investigator must
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symbolic structures of the voluntary association which he or she desires to explore.
The researcher must explore the hegemonic nature of the expressive functions for
an association which serve to "convert" individuals to the consciousness of a weunion with the ideological primary group.

Thus. the ideological primary group

may serve as a referential agent for the more formal voluntary association. An
orientation of this sort fails to include a consideration of the expansion of membership as a result of proselytization.

Instead. the researcher should more appropriately

approach the conversion process as an actual form of a situational process of negotiation through which individuals consider the "relevance" of the ideological
primary group's symbolic reality for the resolution of his or her private-personal
troubles.
structure.

This procedure is not possible within a thematic examination of ideological
Therefore. voluntary associations are herein heuristically divided through

the Marxian nature of the association.

Drawing upon the work of Gramsci (1972).

the balance of this thesis will address the phenomenological commitment of the
assoc/uclon and its relationsh ip to the " phantasied" orientation of the association
toward social change as reified. conjunctural. or organiC. A systemiC orientation
to the phenomenological dimensions of these realities is attempted in the follOWing
chapter with a thematic analysis of publications which reflect the association' s
collective-self.
Summary
This chapter has addressed a number of conceptual inadequacies in the
dominant theoretical orientatilJns to homosexuality. The assumption of the symbolic

-66interactlonlst traditlon--that humans are born with a sexual drive which may be
directed through internalized meanings--Is considered to hold adequate explanatory
power for the purposes of this research.
The influence of Ideological primary groups on adult socialization and the
Identification of individuals with more structural forms of Ideological presentation
(voluntary associations) herein is considered to be a theoretical area which may
appropriately be subjected to an ethnomethodologlcal approach. A presentation of
the more structural components of the homosexual reality. however. is also useful
for a Marxian sociology of knowledge since the legitimate possiblllties for social
praXis by the we-union may be delineated.

This delineation is phenomenological

and thus places emphasis on the immanent meanings put forth by voluntary associations in relationship to social change.

CHAPTER IV
COLLECTIVE MANIFESTATIONS OF IDEOLOGY:
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Voluntary associations link the categorical phenomena of homoselCua lity to
society and thereby establish legitimate possibilities for social pralCis within each
hegemon ic substructure.

The hegemonic force of a particular weltanschauung

establishes the symbol ic parameters of the soc ia l change dlsired by the collective
we-union and, therefore, "totalizes" the legitimate commitment of the association.
This chapter specifies a categorical framework for a phenomenological analysis of
such purposive collective-presentations-of-self as they appear In "official" llterature
collected from ;!4 voluntary associations of homosexuals.
The purpose here is to acquaint the reader with the justifications employed
for the categorization of the various phenomenological components within categorically
identified welta /l nauungen. These justifications are more structurally apparent
through an identification of the categorical placements and also through a presentation
of essential, thematic statements within the literature. These statements clarify the
distinction between weltanschauungen which operate within the collective legitimation
of homosexuality. Subsequently, a referent typology is constructed which serves as
an ideological map of the substructure of legitimation within the subuniverse of
homosexuality .
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An explication of the collective-presentation-of-self for each association
necessitates an analysis of their literature which focuses upon three specific areas
of importance in the delineation of ideological structure. These ideological components are (I) the topical relevance (value orientation) of the association, {21 the
various interpretative relevances (ideals) presented by the association, and (3) the
phenomenological commitment of the association to social change.
The topical relevance presented by an association directs the attention of
potential actors (Weigert, 1975: 92) and makes possible a clarification of the value
orientation promulgated by the association with regard to the deviant category (see
Schutz, 1970: 71). Thus, the phenomena is viewed positively, negatively, or its
relevance to existence may be questioned.
The interpretative relevances presented by the association "enable the actor
to understand topically problematic objects" (Weigert, 1975: 93). Since " there is no
such thing as a type as such" (the outcome of formerly valid systems of interpretative
relevances) "but Oilly types related to particular problems" (Schutz, 1970: 63), these
interpretative relevances relate the specific value orientation (topical relevance) of
the categorical phenomena to "outside" phenomena. The interpretative relevances
also provide a foundation for possible rationalization of the social reality manifested
in homosexual activities to coltsociates of the "we-union" (see Speigelberg, 1973).
Speigelberg indicates that
in itself the mere address does not lead to any change in the person
addressed. However, such a change does occur as soon as he pays attention to this appeal. It is his turning face, his focusing on the speaker
[organic intellectual) as his spokesman, which the address aims to
bring about (1973: 133-134).
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unit and delineates the relevance systems manifested by each unit along with the
degree of phenomenological COIr.mitment to those systems of relevance.

The research

is oriented tOlVard two components of the substructure of homosexuality.

These

components are found in the ideological modality of the association as they exist in
relation to a phenomenological commitment to social change (radical, liberal, or
conservative) and the Manian nature of the aSsociation In the relation of the individual to the Collective-identity (relfied, co njunctual, organic). Methodologically,
this analysis constitutes a subjective endeavor through which the framework of
research may he communicated; however, the essential process remains preconceptually thematic and, therefore, intuitive In nature. Contrary to an "objectivist"
approach toward knolVledge claSSification, phenomenolOgical analysis identifies
emergent rather than historical meanings of ideological phenomenon (see Piccone,
1971).

These immanent meanings are actually moral judgments (topical relevances)

and /f' _ir accounts (interpretative relevances).

Even though these moral statements

with their explanatory accounts only retain validity within the Context in which the
act relates to the individual world (Rock, 1972: J 42), the categorical identifications
attached to these judgments are Social constructions made manifest through an
ideological structure.

The categories of (1) Marxian nature and (2) phenomenological

commitment, therefore, are open for examination.
The Identification .?~r~eological Modalities
The classification of each association as conservative, llheral, or 1'lldical
Is contingent upon the topical and interpretative relevances and their relationship to
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The various dimensions of the

topical relevances have been addressed above.
Following Stanage (1970) the phenomenological commitment of each association is divided into (I) consentive. (2 ) intendive. and (3) active dimensions of commitment. " Commitment is defined as .•• the overt activity of ••• expressingcommissive
language in some degree and at some level. i. e •• consentive language. intendive
language. and/or active language" (38). Stanage presents examples of sentences
exp r essing intendive and active language in organizations of the radical right.
The statement of goals. purposes. programs. etc •• of the patriotic
clubs. . . are often couched in what has been called intendive and
active language ••. Witness the John Birch Society's signs. "Support
your local police" (intendive) and "Impeach Earl Warren" (active)
(1970: 40).
Thus. Stanage classifies commissive language into three distinct fOCi.

These are

utilized in this research to delineate the association's phenomenological commitment
to legitimate social praxis for the collective-self. A consentive dimension of comm itment is associated with conservatism. whereas the intendive and active dimenSions
of phenonu:!nological commitment respectively are categorized as liberal and radical.

The Specification of Marxian Nature
The Marxian nature of each association is specified through the essential
identification of the we-union as it relates to other categorical phenomena and the
possibilit.ies for social change inherent in these identifications. The identification of
the source of these possibilities reflects either a "relfied" or a "processural"
(conjunctural or organic) Marxian identity. The nature of a Marxian identity serves
as a referent for the projected essence of the community with which the categorical
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of externalizing agents in which case it Is specified within a processural category.
On the other hand, the essential nature of community may be viewed as a mediating
agent for a n epiphenomenon in which case it is specified as relfied.

In this instance

homosexuality is "totalized" whereas the processural categories (conjunctural,
organiC) represent homosexuality as an agent for historically emerging social change.
This distinction of identities is clearly of importance to a Marxian sociology
of knowledge within a phenomenological analysis. The proletariat (as a "self-made"
phenomena) specifies the re lation between a precategorized "feeling" and a categorical identification which take s on " reflexive" characteristics. These refiexive
characteristics are conveyed through an intersubjective reality which depends upon
symbolic interaction and categorical identification (Mehan and Wood, 1975: 222).
The processural identification s uggests a categorical linkage of members with an
ontology of human mediation.

The Presentation of Categorical Substructu re
The ide ntification of each substructural category (ide ologica l modality and
Marxian nature) depends upon an "essential" belief in the pOSSibility and desirability
of social praxiS withIn the various levels of a categorical phenomena. The ideological
modalities (conservative, liberal, radical) are identified In relation to the phenomenological structure of relevance for each association.
The radical modality is found only In those associations emphasizing a
processural nature of community and an active (phenomenological commltment)positive (topical relevance) structure of relevance.

Historically, this modality has
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the role of each referent type In homosexual legitimation. The liberal modality
appears exclusively with the processural Marxian nature and a conjunctural referent
for legitimate social praxis.

The conservative modality, on the other hand, appears

in the categories for reified as well as processural Marxian nature of community.
The consentive-positive relevance structure is present as a processural and a
reified mediation for the individual and his accompanying "collective-self." The
variation between these placements is a result of their respective presentations of
that agent mediating the relation of the individual to the community. Consentivepositive relevance structures within the reified-conservative referent present the
mediation as epiphenomenal, whereas consentive-positive relevance structures for
the conjunctural-conservative referent present the mediation as a structural and
interpersonal matter.

The latter retains a symbolic human essence whereas the

former presents the mediation as a purely spiritual epiphenomenon. The substructu re of t hl • referent typology represents the analytical components of a subuniverse of meaning . The possibilities of legitimate social praxis for the collective,
however, must be viewed purely as projections.

Data Sources
To obtain a sample of associations from which to draw the appropriate data,
the researcher consulted the Encyclopedia of Associations (1975) from which six
initial voluntary associations of homosexuals were identified by title and address (see
Appendix A).

This formal connection to the population of voluntary associations of

homosexuals seemed more desirable initially than a direct contact with one specific
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data collection.
Except for the radical-organic type. initial subject organizations were representative of the typological referent types specified below. The radical-organic
referent. through which the identity of homosexuality becomes a mediating agent for
a totalized "human" form (the proletariat). is not included in the Encyclopedia of
Associations. The researcher was informed of the existence of these associations
(Lavender and Red Union; and the Gay Caucus of the Youth Against War and Fascism)
by a representative of the Gay Activists Alliance.

Data Collection
The six subject groups were first contacted by telephone. The purpose of
proceeding in this manner stemmed both from the researcher's apprehension concerning contact witll these associations and the need for sensitization to appropriate
patterns of communication with homosexuals. The phone calls were also useful for
th

OJ

struction of a satisfactory contact letter (Appendix B) in which the request for

literature from each association was made.

The literature surveyed was in the form

of newsletters. pamphlets. books. and other material published by the associations
which focused on the homophile movement. The researcher was "sensitized" to
appropriate protocol during the phone calls. For instance. when he mentioned the
notion of a group ideology in an initial phone call. he was verbally reprimanded by a
member of the Gay ActiviSts Alliance of New York. who denied the possibility that his
association might be in the business of proselytizing "deviants. " The use of the term
ideology as part of the description of the association's Weltanschauung was subsequently replaced by a more acceptable concept--"orientatlon. "
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the homophile movement. Afte r cross-referencing the Hst of organizations obtained
from the initial six organizations, the researcher made contact with a total of thirtytwo organizations (Appendix C). Some form of information was received from twentyfour of these groups.

Due to financial resources and time limitations, the total list ob-

tained from the associations could not be contacted. This problem might haw been
aggravated even more if the decision for "total" contact had been made since some
of the associations did not name other groups.
Clearly, the representativeness of this sample when considering the total
population of voluntary associations of homosexuals is questionable.

However, the

general difficulty in obtaining material from each group was magnified by the average
length of time (over two months) for reply after the initial contact.

This difficulty

resulted in a four-month data collection period. As a result, we were unable to
S .J '

pie past the second stage of reference.
'llle data available to the researcher is adequate, however, since the purpose

for constructing the typology was heuristic. Modal orientations toward social praxis
were identified for all three degrees of phenomenological commitment,and instances
of Marxian nature were specified within the three possible dimensions. Obviously,
any attempt to proffer "definitive propositions" necessitate a larger sample.

Typology Construction
The construction of the typology for representation of the deviant substructure

within the category of homosexual identification involved an in-depth review of the

- 75_

nature of the association (nature of the ideals).
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-77An instance of an active phenomenological comm Itment Is ft)und In the IIterature of the Gay Caucus of Youth Against War and Fascism.
It can be done, and to end our oppression, it must be done, but it
will take all of us together, united and strong, to stop the U. S.
death machine before it stops the world.
Fight Back to Smash Gay Oppression! (Y. A. W. F., The
Struggle Against Sexual Oppression: no date).
-The relation between the Individual and the categorical identity is presented
as positive within this referent (organic-radical). The positive qualities of this
identification, however, are held to be contingent upon a positive identification for
community with all "oppressed people ...
The socialist revolution is a permanent revolution, one of continuous change. Along with many changes that need to be made in the
socia list countries, the gay question is surely 'l ne of them. In the
meantime, we ought to concentrate on preparing our own revolutions,
in which the struggle for the liberation of all oppressed people,
including gay people, is an indispenslble condition for victory
(McCuffln, 1976: 83).
The organic-radical referent therefore is retained through an active phenomenological
commitment a nd a positive sense of identity with the "community" of oppressed
peoples.

Conjunctural- Radical
The conjunctural-radical referent represents an identification field for

particular we-unions which articulate ideals for liberation within the specific category of homosexuality. The following statement drawn from the Gay Activists
Alllance exemplifies this stance.
G. A. A. seeks to draw gays together, whatever their differences on
other questions, to struggle for the one thing that we all can agree
on, one which asswnes central importance for all of us: gay liberation
(the Gay Activist, Dec. -Jan.; 1975: 2).

-78The conjunctural nature of the association is identified through the particularistlc goals of categorical liberation.

Internally, the phenomenological structure of

this referent is interpreted as an active phenomenological commitment and a positive
orientation toward the relation of the individual and the community of categorical
deviants.
The active phenomenological commitment of this referent was identified
through statements of commissive language within the literature.

The following

paragraphs taken from the National Gay Task Force's publication, It's Time, demonstrate this commitment.
In the December issue of It's Time, "Take Action" focused on

letter-writing as one way of letting legislators know how much this
bill is needed. This month's project involves setting up meetings
with your congressperson (It's Time, January 1976: 3).
Write letters--Letters are important! Contrary to popular
belief they are read, if not by the politician, the n by one of his or
her legislative aides (It's Time, December 1975: 3).
These organizations not only promote social action, but also present guidelines toward the implementation of these goals. A topical relevance expressing a
pOSitive, essential relation between the individual and the categorically deviant
community is also apparent within this referent category. SpeCification of the positive value stance is drawn from the Mattachine Society of the Niagra Frontier.
If we wait until the dawn of realization or the age of sexual

reasoning comes along, we'll wait forever. There are no mythological forces that "bring the light" to people's eyes. Any
progress that's made, any revelations that are laid before us, are
brought Into being by a collective reaction on the pa rt of those suffering inuustices ••• To make this a reality, we need--Gay
Visibility (Fifth Freedom, May-June, 1975: 7).
The very first person that should know you're gay is yourself.•• Gay is health, gay is good and it's Love the way you

- 79want it--not the way someone else wants you to want it (Fifth
Freedom. May-June. 1975: 7).

Organlc- Radlcal/ConJunctu ral- Radical
The basic phenomenological difference between these referents is apparent
when the ideals and essential Identities of the we-unions are examined.

While the

organic-radical referent focuses upon the need for "totalization" of particularistic
types through a universalistic human object of oppression (the proletariat) and
stresses the need for unity among all oppressed peoples. the conJunctural-radlcal
referent focuses upon the totalization of a particular categorical type of oppression
(the homosexual \.

These ideals correspond to the essential identity of specific we-

unions within each referent category. The essential identity for the organic-radical
we-union Is specified as proletarian through a particular type (homosexual). whereas
the essential Identity of the conjunctural-radlcal Is totalized In the same particular
type. Each retains possibilities for "legitimate" social change on distinct levels.

Conjunctura

ral

The conjuncrural-liberal referent for the typology is composed of three cells
which are not mutually exclusive since they share a common referential category.
All three cells share the conjunctural-liberal referent for possibilities of social
change and a phenomenological commitment to that referent.

The structural differ-

entiation of these three cells is Identified within the relevances promulgated by the
association and the phenomenological commitment of each.
The intendve-neutral substructural type for the conjunctural-liberal referent
ideal-type posits a neutral topical relevance In regard to the relation of the individual
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right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, as proclaimed
for all men by the Declaration of Independence, and to secure for
homosexuals the basic rights and liberties established by the word
and the spirit of the Constitution of the United States (Washington
Mattachine: no date).
The Capitol District Gay Community Center also presents an instance of an
intendive phenomenological commitment through commissive language.
Please take the time now to personally thank Tom Brown
and Fred Field for their support [Gay Civil Rights Bill for New
York State--defeated] ••• It is most important that we recognize and thank those who support us--you should do so if you
live in the area (Gay Report, May, 1976: 1-2).
Through promulgating a pOSitive topical relevance toward the individual and
the creation of a categorically deviant community, the intendive-positive cell is differentiated from other cells within the conjunctural-liberal ideal type. An emphasis
on the changing of legal definitions, however, links this cell to other cells within the
referent.
The active-neutral cell of the conjunctural-liberal referent type denotes a
neutral

D'

1 relevance in relation to the individual and the community.

However,

the "possibility" of developing a life-style ar'.lund the homosexual phenomena is posited.
The Homosexual Effort for Legal Protection (H. E. L. P. ) exemplifies this orientation.
Homophiles are in fact a behavioral minority without a
common ethos. Certain members of this population have,
however, been able to establish a singular and viable lifestyle
on a largely individual basis (H. E. L. P., July, 1975: 7).
This cell is also exemplified by an active phenomenological commitment to
social change and is oriented toward social as well as political change.
We must work to dispel the stereotype of the pathetic, poodletoting old queen, or the effete "Boys in the Band" syndrome. No
longer can we or shall we apologize for living (H. E. L. P., Sept.,
1975: 3).

-82We have to ask ourselves: what can we as an organization
contribute towards improving the Quality of Lifestyles [patterns
of social behavior) within the TOTAL "Gay Community. " First,
every member of a homophile lifestyle can work to improve his/
her awareness of political environments, politicians, and wouldbe politicians, being particularly ~areful not to support the wellpackaged glib campaigners who are quick tOforget them upon
election ••• Right now I know of five major Gay organizations
which are concerned with the advancement of Gay Rights. All of
these organizations are doing a fine job, but they are duplicating
each other in many aspects. . • I propose that we organize Into
one coordinating group. There is no need to form another organization for this purpose, because it already exists. I am talking
about the Gay Rights Panel of the American Civil Liberties Union
(H. E. L. P., Sept., 1975: 2).
H. E. L. P. 's emphasis on the formation of a coalition of we-unions to work
toward the attainment of full civil-rights for gays demonstrates a speCification which
limits the coordination to "organizations which are concerned with the advancement
of Gay Rights." Thus, the possibility of identification with other types of "deviants"
becomes evident through an Instrumental organization acting as a mediating agent-in this case the A. C. L. U.

Conjunctural-Liberal
The types within the conjunctural-liberal referent are differentiated through
the promulgation of varying topical relevances and phenomenological commitments.
However, the ideals (interpretative relevances) of these types (full civil rights for
homosexuals) places them within the same referent category.

Conjunctural-Conservative
The conjunctural-conservatlve referent is an exclusive referent.

The rele-

vances put forth by we-unions of this type are classified within the same categories.
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individual and the "community. " The following statements by the Mattachine Society
of New York and the West Side Discussion Group may serve as examples of this
orientation.
Today many therapists are realizing that homosexuality is
a viable life-style and that trying to change someone on such a
basic dimension as sexual orientation is unnecessary and actually
dangerous (Mattachine New Times. October. 1975: 5).
Each gay woman and man has to be self-made ••• Gays
are presumed to he superior [in intellectual and artistic pursuits];
but their superiority. therefore. is caused by and "relative to" the
cultural pattems around them (The West Sider. December. 1976: 6).
Thus. the relationship between the individual and the life-style of homosexuality
which actually comprises the "community" is presented in a positive manner.
The conjunctural-conservative referent type. however. does not contain
within its presentation the "pOSSibility" of a collective effort by the association for
changing specific aspects of the social structure (legal impOSitions). The phenomenological comm itment is therefore considered consentive in nature. As the West
Side Discussion Group indicates:
Our organ ization is non-political and does not take any stands
on any issues (Personal Communication. February. 1976).
Associations of this type emphasize the social-psychological implications of
"oppression" and attempt to deal with individualistic problems through an organizational effort.

While they are expressive associations, they cannot !Je categorized as

"purely" expressive associations since they represent organized efforts to deal with
oppression.

For example. the Mattachine Society of New York cooperates with the

local police department to solve crimes against gays through its "Community Action

.

.

Now" program. This is a collective effort employing instrumental action to help
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political commiOTIent to this effort on a collective level.

Reified-Conservative
This referent is constituted by two distinct modal differentations.

These two

modalities (consentive-negative and consentive-positive) are identified with a reWed
Marxian nature and a conservative posture vis-a-vis social change. The differentation of these two modalities may be identified through an examination of the type of
reification presented within their respective ideological manifestations. The reifications of these associations are genemlly identifiable through their orientation toward
the "community. "
The consentive-negative cell of the reified conservative referent type is
chamcterized by a negative topical relevance which presents the homosexual identity
as an undesimble phenomena.
If homosexual persons have to create a "gay consciousness"

thal rivals a "heterosexual consciousness" in order to assert their
sexual rights then nothing is gained. The result Is a sexist society.
The most compelling argument in favor of homosexual acts and
relationships (outside of the pleasure of their performance) is that
they have never become the foundation for a culture of community
or style of life (Homosexual lnfonnation Center, Newsletter, #21:
no date).
They [persons performing homosexual acts] want hostile laws
changed, but they resent the attempt to urganize their lives around
homosexuality just as much as they resent the centuries-old attempt
to organize their lives around heterosexuality (Homosexual lnfonnation Center, Newsletter #21: no date).
It is apparent that In relation to the referent ideal-type the reified-conservative
type of association does not posit the possibility of a categorical we-unlon's
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identified as a reifying agent which tends to abstract the individual from intersubjective existence. The npgative topical relevance does not allow for the existence
of externally conveyed meanings supporting social action through acts identified
with a specific categorical type.
By neglecting the intersubjective realm of social existence, association's
identified as consentive-negative confuse objectification with alienation. The result
is the kind of reifying tendency specified by O'Neill.
Alienation is a phenomenon which arises when men are estranged
from the product of their mental, phYSical, and social activity
with the result that they fail to realize an ideal of authentiC being
(1972: 76).
The consentive-negative modality does not allow for the existence of meaning
structures with their possible political effect as a social force. Thus, it cannot
incorporate a recognition of its Marxian nature, or political community, through individualistic abstraction (see Megill, 1970).
On the other hand, the consentive-positive cell of the reified-conservative
referent is characterized by a positive topical relevance toward the individual'S relation with the categorical community. This topical relevance, however, reified the
"positive" relation of the individual to the deviant community. As the Universal
Fellowship of Metropolitan Community Churches indicates:
It is no better to be gay than to be straight. It is no
better to be straight than to be gay, but for the gay person it
is best to be gay. That means that there is every reason in
the world for a gay boy or girl or man or woman to rejoice
in being what he or she is, not ashamed of it••• but gladly,
and with delight, accepting the drive, thanking God for it and
resolving to be and act as what one is (In Unity, October,
1975: 18).

-86Thus, the homosexual phenomenon is viewed as being spiritually rather than
humanly created. The individual homosexua l is "atomized" from the community of
categorical deviants through a metaphysical identification of self.

Dignity, a

homosexual association, suppotts such a reif1ca tion of identity as demonstrated in
the following statement.
We believe that gay Catholics are members of Christ's mystical
body, numbered a mong the people of God (Personal Communication:
April, 1976).
The phenomenological commitment for the consentive-positive orientation
within the reWed - conse rva tive re ferent is identified a s consentive. The Universa l
Fellowship of Me tropolitan Community Churche s expresses this commiSSive language
by indicating tha t
••• as crusader or communicator, In Unity [the association's
publication] wHl champion God's people's right to avoid even
subtle witch burnirgs. In Unity should not be a political publication, nor should it advance personal ambitions of any person or
group (In Unity: October, 1975: 9).
Consentl

osltive modalities reify the homosexual phenomena as a pre-

cO!lstitutive type which ma y be ide ntified with a metaphysical phenomena. Thus,
the intersubjective and historical nature of a specific phenomenon (homosexual acts)
are subordinated to identification with a spiritual category.

Relfied- Conjunctural
The instances of reification which are identified within this reierent represent distinct phenomena which can be related to a Marxian sociology of knowledge
through immanent meanings within a histOrical context. Consentive-negative moda lities identify the objectification of the individual with a categorical type (homosexuality)
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as an infringement on an "authentic" existence.

This authenticity Is presumed to be

lost through social objectification. Consentive-posltive modalities, on the other hand,
view social objectification through :lOmosexuality as a reflection of a higher orde r.
Dignity, for instance, lends support for this orientation.
We are all aware that many different settings, situations,
people or places act as vehicles through which the Spirit moves
within our Church. Today, I believe, that Spirit is manifesting
itself through a unique group of people, speaking about injustices,
both social and religious, that surround them (Dignity: January,
1976: 7).
Neither of the two modalities is concerned with the intersubjectlve meanings
which are promulgated historically through homosexuality's everyday existence.
Everyday existence depends upon a set of practice-activities within which man creates
the social world through communication and action.

The meanings upon which man

may act are not consistent with a "human" ontology, but Instead have epiphenomenal
characteristics which may be identified as a relfication.

Thus, the essence of homo-

sexuality in the consentlve-negatlve type may be Identified by Its failure to produce a
histo tll)al society. Alternatively, the e ssence of homosexuality in the consentiveposlti ve type lies in the movem ent of spirit.

Other Referents
Within the typology presented in Table I there are four referent Ideal-types
which were identifiable for which no frequencies were found among the sampled
associations.

Following Is a brief explanation for these empty cells.

Reified- Radical
The reified-radical referent was not found among the sampled associations.
The radical modality within the conjunctural-radlcal/organlc-radlcal referents was

-88Identified with an active phenomenological commitment to social change and a positive topical relevance.

From this evidence, it follows that a reified-radical referent

does not retain an active phenomenological commitment. The active commitment
necessitates an intersubjective identification of action orienting objectives. The
reifying qualities identified in the reified-conservative referent, however, negated
the intersubjective essence of its action by means of an epiphenomenal essence.

Reified- Liberal
An explanation for the absence of a reWed-liberal referent specifically
hinges upon the phenomenological commitment. The commitment to social change
specified within the liberal modality is accompanied with guides for social action on
a conjunctural level.
A reified-liberal referent may not be expected to have empirical manifestations.

This is due to (1) the necessity of objectification of social action within the

lIbe r . modality, and (2) the emphasis upon the "human" effect on political phenomena.
Thus, the political and intersubjective nature of the community serves as the essential component of this referent type.
With both the relfied-radical and reified-conservative referents, the possibility of their empirical manifestation depends upon the ability to identity a Marxian
identity. Such a process of identification must emphasize the intersubjective nature
of the community and must identify the prerequisites for a processural orientation
to the problem of social change.

-89Organic - Libe ra I/O rganic-Conse rvative
TIle absence of the organic-liberal and organic-conservative referents may

be explained through the distinction drawn by Gramsci (1972) concerning conjunctural
and organic subaltern groups.

Within its categorical identification the organic asso-

ciation must retain the assumption of the possibility of social change beneficial to a
"social bloc" constituted of all oppressed people. The instances identified within the
liberal and the conservative modalities do not identify to a "humanly" totalized form
or ideal-type.

Instead, the possibilities of social action are limited to the trans-

formation of "fetichized morality" through the changing of rational-legal rules.

Summary
The preceding discussion has focused on the categorical qualities of homosexuality through an explication of the ideological substructure which voluntary
associations promulgate through their literature . . The conceptual goal of the typology
presented in Table I

i

fundamentally heuristic in nature.

The typology relates

Marxist ideology with its identifiable modes of consciousness to other ideological positions through phenomenological analysis.

The analysis focuses on the internal

structure of the specific ideological modalities. The internal structure is identified
through systems of phenomenological relevances as they address the possibilities of
legitimate social praxis. The theoretical task for a Marxian sociology of knowledge
becomes apparent through this clarification of the relationship of social praxis to a
categorical identity. This "task" involves a specification of the scope of immanent
meanings within categorical types and the relationship of these meanings to the future
possibilities of collective action. Birnbaum argues for the necessity of this type of
theoretical endeavor.

-90It follows from the idea of Praxis •.• that the moral and political
implications of an assertion as to the organization of society and
its movement be examined, that the possible consequences of a
given historical situation be explored in their relevance for future
direction of ht:man activity (1971: 126).
Thus, the referent typology presented and discussed in this chapter attempts
to heuristically specify modal representations of consciousness within categorical
types. These representations of consciousness in turn indicate the possibilities and
direction for future human activity within the collective we-union.

The limits of

"legitimate" human activity within each specified orientation to social praxis is
inherent in the Marxian nature of the association.
The "reifled" referent totalizes the essence of human activity within an epiphenomenon (the abstract individual or the abstract spiritual collective). Conjunctural
referents, on the other hand, totalize the essential nature of their specific orientation
toward social praxiS within a particularized categorical type.

This categorical type

becomes self-evident through the association of identifying individuals. Organic
referents, however, specify the possibility of a "totalized" human form (proletariat)
existing within oppressive relations and couched in a specific historical totality
(capitalism ).
The heuristic qualities of this research remain its major contribution to the
field.

The theoretical implications of such an analysis as well as suggestions for

epistemological refinement are addressed in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY A:-.lD CONCLUSIONS

The substructural typology presented in the preceding chapter raises several
methodological and theoretical issues which are discussed below. The presentation
of the typology serves as an explanation for the possibility of a qualitative de reification within a specific structural phenomena. Such an explanation is a product of
common-sense-understanding of stigma--a s pecific existential conditlon--as It is
symbolically conveyed through an intersubjective identification with a conceptually
legitimized type of we-phenomenon. However, legitimations are presented through
the "conceptual manipulations they make possible" (Miller, 1972: 127) and the refore
depend on continuous processes of social interaction with the we of co-presence
(see Speigelberg: 1973). Thus, typificatory structures are made manifest in the
symbolic reality of a sub-universe of meaning within which members of voluntary
ass

,S\~ l ons

engage in Intentional activities.

In the prece ding presentation the substructural categories were identified
through the socio-linguistic presentation-of-self promulgated by homosexual weunions. These collective-presentations-of-self were interpreted through a form of
a Marxian sociology of knowledge as essentially outlined by Antonio Gramsci. The se
presentations, then, are essentially products of organiC Intellectuals who intersubjectively relate to a categorically identified form of deviance.
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The phenomenological commitment to social change promulgated through
particular weltanschauungen herein has been Identified as a characteristic element
of the relevance systems of particular forms of "human" consciousness. These
relevance systems have been shown to be symbolic recognitions of legitimation for
specific forms of collective action.

Thus. the investigator is able to identify typi-

fiable structures within a taken-for-granted reality of categorical deviance.
Sacks (1972). writing from an ethnomethodologlcal position. presents typificational structure as the product of the interaction of two characteristic phenomena.
To Sacks. the first element of typificatory structure consists of the "consistency
rule" which suggests that the relation between two variables or perceived social
types is mediated and "placed" through an informational item or category. Categorical phenomena. then. may become the object of a taken-for-granted nature or topical
relevance. Sacks' second conceptual rule. the "economy rule." delimits the scope
of inquiry into the processurnl elements of typlficatlonal structures. This form of
typ "f'cd meaning structure serves to confer practical or interpretative relevance
upon one interpI<!tational device to the e xclusion of other explanatory mechanisms
(1972: 31-34).
These rules of typification have been employed in this thesis in the form of
the topical and the interpretative relevances.

The implementation of these relevance

structures has enabled the investigator to specify the possibilities of collective action
for particular sub-structural ideal-types with their accompanying essential identities.
The specification of interpretative relevances as they relate to a phenomenological
commitment to the attainment of these ideals has been utilized to differentiate the
Marxian nature of specific ideal-typical referents within the sampled voluntary
associations of homosexuals.

-93Theoretical Implications
Constituting a phenomenological exegesis of a reflexive sociology of knowledge within a Marxian paradigm, this thesis has emphasized the categorical elements
of the ontological realities of specific voluntary associations of deviants. Clearly,
the most important theoretical implication of this thesis lies in the conceptual synthesis of the labeling/symbolic interactionist and phenomenological orientations in
the study of deviance. This synthesized orientation serves as the basis for the
a nalysis of the formation of symbolic displays of unity for a categorically deviant
type.

This theoretical stance allows for the possibility of a refleXive form of a

Marxian sociology of knowledge oriented to the transformation of existing institutional
relationships through a phenomenological portrayal of ideological meanings.
The conceptual synthesis of the labeling and phenomenological perspectives
in the study of social deviance allows the researcher to emphasize the intersubjective
base of identity and the rhetorical possibilities of self-transformation within a
particuh'r type.

This emphasis on the qualitative realm of social praxis presupposes

a Marxia n sociology of knowledge which is not limited to an " objectivist" dichotomy
between Marxist knowledge and bourgeOiS ideology (see Piccone, 1973; Birnbaum,
1971).

Instead, in this thesiS orientations to social praxis are presented as they

relate to the possibilities for social change promulgated through the relevance
structures of a collective presentation-of-self on the reified, conjunctural, and
organiC levels.
This theoretical explication of Marxian sociology of knowledge within the
study of social deviance allows for a conceptual redefinition of class. Such a redefinition acknowledges the contradictions within a type of Marxism which identifies

-94the proletariat as an objective entity, instead of an intentionally created phenomenon
(see Gouldner, 1973). Blum specifically describes the absence of a reflexive orientation within the " orthodox" (objectivist I Marxist paradigm as
•.• an invisible separation which is erected between Marx's speech
and that about which he speaks . . . there is no notion of the unified
character of the praxis of language. or of the way in which so-called
"object statements" are only given life within an interpretative context of interests (1973: 25).
From a phenomenological orientation to Marxism, Piccone indicates that
a new, critical Marxism adequate to today's realities must start
out by reconstituting first and foremost the notion of class (1971: 23).
Following from this theoretical disarray within the Marxian paradigm, some proponents of the ethnomethodological orientation to social reality have advocated the
notion of "class •.• as scxnethlng persons do with their speaking practices" (Mehan
and Wood, 1975: 218).

However, other ethnomethodologists have indicated that the

proleta riat is made up of everyone who produces alienated speech (see Filmer, et. al.,
1973).

These advocates of the ethnomethodological practice of Marxism argue that

they
• . . do resea rch and w rite papers together, but not in an effort to
describe the world. instead their work represents a "commitment
to another community. A community bought (read) and sold (written)
for instrumental purposes. • • for the mode of existence which is
enslaved by what it seeks to enslave" (Mehan and Wood, 1975: 222).
Thi s orientation to the practice of

~1arxlsm

does not retain a refleXive stance

vis-a-vis social reality and the intersubjective dimensions of symbolic identification.
These ethnomethodologlsts deny the " instrumentality" of the "de-stratifying" practices
of their "community," yet as Mehan and Wood have indicated:

-95The purpose of this community is to tutor one another in the
experience that ali praxis is sensuous human activity. Reading
and writing are not to be excluded from this conception (1975: 223).
TIle community with which the ethnomethodological school identifies repre-

sents a hegemonic force since "theirs is a method by which they hope to experience
Marx's reflexive truths" (Mehan and Wood. 1975: 223). Within this general context
Wolff indicates that both "philosophical radicals" and "political radicals" must
suspend preconceived notions of class. Wolff. however. argues that
awareness of this task ••. calls for [the recognition by philosophical
radicals of J••• the moral inescapability of political responsibility.
It calls for pe rsuading political radicals. • • to recognize human
beings and to understand and treat them as ends (1973: 55).
Such a recognition is baSic to the Husserllan notion of the intersubjective nature of
subjectivity (see Piccone. 1973).
sociology of knowledge which is

It is of no small significance to that Marxian
0

riented toward the possibility of intersubjective

totalization of particularistic problems. The possibilities for this totalization of
homosexual substructure have been addressed in the preceding chapters through particularistic (con"'" <:tural) or universalized (organic) ideals.

However. within each

of the associations sampled the presentation of an intersubjective nature was considered a necessary condition for its placement within a processural type.
The promulgation of particularistic or universalized ideals by an association
represents an orientation to structural reform which" is implemented by the people
who demand it" (Marzotto. et. al •• 1975: 44).

Piccone. however. expresses hesita-

tion with regard to the efficacy of structural investigations due to the absorption of
alienation into mediating categories.

He indicates that the practical effect of the

criticism entailed in structural analysis is that "it freezes the fluid reality of groups
into fixed stereotypes" (1971: 30). As it relates to the research embodied in this thesis.

- 96Piccone's criticism is certainly viable. The expllcation of a structural presentation,
however, may be enhanced through a more systematic methodological orientation;
and the importance of the present endeavor lies in the direction or heuristic guidance
it may provide for such an approach.

Methodological Impllcations
Heretofore analyses of various fonus of voluntary associations have avoided
the type cf phenomenological analysis of substructure attempted in this thesis. The
method here employed transcends earlier efforts in the sense that it allows for the
differentiation of levels of commitment to the legitimation of a negative, collective
identity. Sagarin's Odd Man In (1969), perhaps the major contribution to the field,
relies heavily upon a simplistic dichotomization of associational types which views
such groups as being either instrumental or expressive.

He fails to recognize that

the critical, phenomenological Significance of associational organization lies in the
fact that the '1 ction associated with organizational efforts is both symbolic and instrumental. The ana lytical distinction of a purely expressive or purely instrumental
association is simply not possible. The very action of symbolic identification is
instrumental in that it facilltates the continuation of a categorical identity with a concomitant hegemony of meaning.

The method of analysis employed in this thesis--a

phenomenologically-oost:d differentiation of the various levels of categorical substructure--is essentially a heuristic framework designed to facilitate microinvestigations of the intersubjective construction of the realities accompanying these
categories.

-97The Ethnomethodological Contribution
The potential contribution of ethnomethodology to the phenomenological approach of this thesis is best put in the pragmatic dictum that "we would not wish to
do other than focus only on that part [of man's behavior] which is overt" (Coulter,
1971: 307). This requirement precludes the ability of ethnomethodological endeavors,
which look for decontextualized coding-rules for human experience and decontextualized
rules of inference to contribute to a phenomenological analysis of categorical substructure. The attempt to experience reflexive truths through reading and writing
within a "community" of ethnomethodologists is "as positivistic in intent as the forging
of Humean causal or probabalistic laws of social life" (Coulter, 1971: 311).
The ethnomethodological emphasis on the "openness" of the social world,
however, is complementary to the phenomenological assumption that ideologies order
collective-interests through the promulgation of relevance systems. The ethnomethodological conception of "family resemblance" among various courses of social
a ction enables the investigator to break away from the essentialist pOSition that presupposes universally common features.
Conversely, the phenomenological conception of the possibilities of social
praxis within an ideological pOSition does not render the individual member a "judgmental dope " (see Garfinkel, i956). Members of categorical we-unions, as ideological participants, may interpersonally negotiate their experiences into public
"we-talk" and through this action of negotiation may invoke the et cetera clause in
ideological Situations.
This interpersonal negotiation is most profound within ideological primary
groups. Thus, an ethnomethodological investigation into the construction of we-talk

-98within ideological primary groups is important for a phenomenological analysis of
ideology which is couched within a Marxian sociology of knowledge. An approach of
this nature must attempt a mapping of ideological substructure within a categorical
type of deviance base d upon intersubjective processes of reality construction. Such
an attempt is beyond the scope of this thesis. A mapping of categorical substructure
would entail an analysis of the possibilities of convergence among various idealtypical referents.

Thus, the possibilities of legitimate social praxis must be viewed

as intersubjectively based meanings. They represent heuristic conceptions instead
of reified sedimentations.
Summary
This thesis has attempted to relate phenomenological relevances, specified
through voluntary associations of deviants, to thematic possibilities of legitimate
social praxis. Utilizing a Marxian sociology of knowledge, this work specifies the
substructural components of categorical identification. These components in tum
may serve as heuristic guides to further research in the area of the negotiated aspects
of collective self-presentation through phenome nological we-talk. By necessity such
research would employ a view of ideology which focuses on a negotiated construction
of reality through ideological primary groups rather than one which conceptually
depicts ideology as a consensual epiphenomena.
This approach to ideology should enable schola rs Il:I implement ethnomethodology
in the study of the interpretative features of political organization. This in tum will
allow for a Marxian sociology which avoids the objectivistic notion of false consciousness in an assessment of a political agency.

Indeed, the organization of labor as

praxis may be viewed as projected moments symbolizing the possibility of emancipation.

APPENDIX A
INITIAL SAMPLE OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS
OF HOMOSEXUALS

Council on Religion and the Homosexual

83 McAlllster Street
Room 421
San Francisco. California
94102
755 Boylston Street
Room 514
Boston. Massachusetts
02116

Dignity

Box 1479
Hunter College. C. U. N. Y.
695 Park Avenue
New York. New York
10021

Gay Academic Union

Post Office Box 2
Village Station
New York. New York
10014

Gay Activists Alliance

Homophile Effort For Legal Protection

Post Office Box 3416
Hollywood. California
90028
59 Christopher Street
New York. New York
10014

Mattachine Society of New York
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APPENDIX B
LETTER OF CONTACT WITH SAMPLED ASSOCIA nONS

Dear _____________
I am a graduate student at Western Kentucky University in sociology and
presently I am working toward the completion of my thesis. My thesis' central
concern is focused on voluntary associations and their relation to social change.
I was referred to your organization by a member of
, who informed
me that you might be of aid to me. I am sending this letter as a request for any
pamphlets or newsletters which your group might have available concerning your
orientation to homosexuality and the relation of the homosexual to society. I
realize that the number of pamphlets or newsletters that you have may be limited;
however, I would greatly appre.;iate it if you could send your latest pamphlets
available with as many of your previous pamphlets or newsletters as possible.
Also, in order to facilitate a more representative sample and lend more
validity to my thesis, I would like to request that you provide me with a list of
from five to ten organizations which you consider to be of prom inence and
importance to the movement for homosexual rights. I am not requesting this
list of organizations to imply that some groups are more important than others;
however, I cannot feasibly hope to gain materials from all the associations representing homosexuality and must limit my scope of inquiry.
Your aid in securing these materials and information will be invaluable
to me as a student and as a person interested in the relation of the homosexual
to society. Your immediate attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated
since as a graduate student I am pressed for time and money. Also, I am enclosing $1. 00 to cover mailing expenses. I assure you that I will send the extra
money if this is not sufficient.
Sincp. rely,

La rry R. Irons
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APPENDIX C
TOTAL SAMPLE OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS SURVEYED
Capitol District Gay Community Center

Box 131
Albany, New York 12201

Chicago Gay Crusader

Post Office Box 872
Chicago, Illinois 60690

Christopher Street West Association

Post Office Box 3949
Hollywood, California 90028

Church of the Beloved DiscIple

348 West 14th Street
New York, New York 10014

Council on Religion and the Homosexual

83 Sixth Street
San Francisco, California 94103

Dignity

755 Boylston Street
Room 514
Boston, Massachusetts 02116

Gay Academic Union

Box 480, Lennox Hill Station
New York, New York 10021

Gay Activists Alliance

Post Office Box 2
Vil\age Sta tion
New York, New York 10014

Gay Caucus: Youth Against War and Fascism

46 West 21st Street
New York, New York 10010

Gay Community Services Center

1213 N. Highland Avenue
Post Office Box 38777
Hollywood, California 90038

Gay People at Columbia Barnard

304 Earl Hall
Columbia University
New York, New York 10027
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APPENDlX C
(continued)
633 S. Shatto Place
LOS Angeles, California 90005
Gay RightS Committee: American Civil
Liberties Union of Southern California

Post Office Box 3416
HoUywood, California 90028

Homophile Effort for Legal protection
3473 t/2 Cahuag a Boulevard
8
HoUywood, CaUfo rnia 9006
Homosexual Information Center

Institute of Social Ethics

BushneU plaza 22 Be
One Gold Street
Hartford, Connecticut 06103
6844 Sunset Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90028

Lavender & Red Union
59 Christopher Street
New york, New york 10014
Mattachine Society of New yorl<
Mattachine Society of the Niag ra Frontier

The Mattachine Society of Washington

Post Office Box 975
EHicott Square Station
Buffalo, New yorl< 14205
Post Office BoX 1032
Washington, D. C. 20013
80 Fifth Avenue
New Yorl<, New yorl< 10011

National Gay Tasl< Force
The Society of Pat RocCO Enlightened Enthusiasts

83 Sixth Street
San FrancisCO, California 94103
83 Sixth Street
San Francisco, California 94103

The society for Individual Rights
Post Office BoX 36271
LoS Angeles, California 90036
Universal FeUowship of MetrOpolitan
Community Churches
West Side Discussion Group

Bol{ 611, Old Chelsea Station
New yorl<, New Yorl< 1001 l
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